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MODERN FORFEITURE LAW AND POLICY: A PROPOSAL
FOR REFORM
LESLIE C. SMITH*
Clear evidence of the forfeiture of property to the state exists in
Judeo-Christian history as early as the time of Moses: "[Ijf an ox
gore a man or woman, and they die, he shall be stoned and his flesh
not eaten. . . . "I From this beginning developed the English com-
mon law doctrine of the deodand, or "gift to God," whereby the
owner of any chattel that caused the death of a human being was
divested of that property. Whether the person to whom the "deadly
thing" belonged was innocent of any wrongdoing was immaterial.
The property was forfeited absolutely to the state; the owner could
neither retain nor later recover it. The policy underlying this law
was clear: the King then would use the revenues gained for charita-
ble purposes or to support the dead man's dependents.2
By 1800 statutory forfeiture had appeared in England and was
applied to persons who violated the customs and revenue laws.
These early actions, brought as in rem proceedings in the Court of
Exchequer, 3 reflected the belief that property rights should be lost
by an owner who engaged in illicit or fraudulent conduct. England
has since statutorily eliminated the deodand institution, deciding
that it was "unreasonable and inconvenient."4
Although never a part of our common law, forfeiture, however, has
existed by statute in the United States since colonial days,5 and
* B.A., Vanderbilt University; J.D., University of Kentucky; LL. M., University of West-
ern Australia.
1. Exodus 21:28.
2. 0. W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 2-12 (1963). See also 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*267, *299-300, *421.
3. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARmS *261. For a complete discussion of the historical devel-
opment of forfeiture law, see T. MrrcHELL, THE DEvELoPMET OF THE LAW OF FoRFmTUREs IN
THE UNrrED STATES (1969); Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspectives on
Deodands, Forfeitures, Wrongful Death & the Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46 TEW. L.Q.
169 (1973).
4. See An Act to Abolish Deodands, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 62 (1846). See also 1 M. HAu, PLEAS
OF THE CROWN 419 (1736).
5. "Long before the adoption of the Constitution the common law courts in the Colonies
- and later in the states during the period of Confederation - were exercising jurisdiction
in rem in the enforcement of forfeiture statutes." C. J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133,
139 (1943). Upon adoption of the Constitution, federal forfeiture statutes were enacted. Act
of July 31, 1789, §§ 12, 36, 1 Stat. 39, 47; Act of Aug. 4, 1790, §§ 13, 22, 27, 28, 67, 1 Stat.
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there are now a myraid of forfeiture acts expressing similar but not
identical policies. The clear legislative intent behind forfeiture of
contraband goods, such as untaxed whiskey, illegal gambling de-
vices, or controlled substances, has been to rid communities of such
illegal items. By legislative enactment certain property has become
so repugnant as to commend its forfeiture to the state.
Though an extensive body of law concerning such property has
developed, a discussion of this aspect of forfeiture is beyond the
scope of this Article. Rather, this Article examines forfeitures of
property that is not per se illegal to possess or use, such as automo-
biles, airplanes, and other conveyances, as well as real property, but
whose use, when combined with a criminal purpose, becomes objec-
tionable. Statutes compelling the forfeiture of such common items
often express a legislative concern different from preventing simple
possession, as clearly set forth in the following passage from a House
of Representatives report:
Enforcement officers of the Government have found that one of
the best ways to strike at commercialized crime is through the
pocketbooks of the criminals who engage in it. Vessels, vehicles,
and aircraft may be termed the operating tools of the dope ped-
dlers, and often represent major capital investments to criminals
whose liquid assets, if any, are frequently not accessible to the
Government. Seizure and forfeiture of these means of transporta-
tion provide an effective brake on the traffic in narcotic drugs.'
The policy is one of "disabling [the accused] from continuing as a
menace to the peaceful existence of the rest of us"7 by depriving him
of the instruments of crime.'
Many federal courts consider certain forfeitures, particularly
those directed against traffickers of narcotics and illegal whiskey, to
be criminal actions,9 exhibiting both punitive and deterrent ele-
157, 161, 163, 176 (both provided for forfeiture of ships and cargoes involved in customs
offenses); Act of Mar. 22, 1794, 1 Stat. 347 (forfeiture of vessels used to deliver slaves to
foreign countries); Act of Mar. 2, 1807, 2 Stat. 426 (forfeiture of vessels used to deliver slaves
to the United States).
6. H.R. REP. No. 2751, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. -, reprinted in [1950] U.S. COnz CONG.
SzRv. 2952, 2952-53.
7. Berkowitz v. United States, 340 F.2d 168, 170 (1st Cir. 1965).
8. One court has said that forfeiture "is a method of civil punishment imposed by the
lawmaking power to restrain, and aid in the prevention of, an offense." United States v. One
1964 Ford 4-Door Galaxie Sedan, 202 F. Supp. 841, 843 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).
9. See, e.g., One Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 700 (1965); United States
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ments.'0 In fact, as one court recited, the only justification for forfei-
tures is "to punish. . . or deter people from committing wrongs and
violating laws."" Likewise, the California Supreme Court found in
forfeiture actions "a close identity to the aims and objectives of
criminal law enforcement."'12 The United States Supreme Court,
however, has held that forfeiture was not part of the punishment for
criminal acts,'3 even though under internal revenue and customs
laws it could be imposed only upon those significantly involved in
a criminal enterprise.' 4 The effect of this conflict over the nature of
forfeiture has been explained cogently by the United States Court
of Claims:
Forfeitures of the type before us are not exclusively "criminal"
in the strict sense. They are hybrid in character. On one side they
are related to the criminal process because intimately connected
with the enforcement of the criminal law, and because the protec-
tions of the Fourth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination apply to forfeiture proceedings.
But in spite of the punitive and deterrent aspects of the sanc-
tions, they have been regarded by the Supreme Court in other
respects as "civil", with criminal law concepts inapplicable. For-
feitures have been held not to violate the double jeopardy prohi-
bitions, and the guilt of the property owner has not been consid-
ered a constitutionally necessary element.'5
v. Five Gambling Devices, 252 F.2d 210, 213 (7th Cir. 1958); United States v. One Bally
"Barrel-O-Fun" Coin Operated Gaming Device, 224 F. Supp. 794, 800 (M.D. Pa. 1963);
United States v. Cato Bros., Inc., 175 F. Supp. 811, 814 (E.D. Va. 1959); United States v.
One 1947 Oldsmobile Sedan, 104 F. Supp. 159, 161 (D.N.J. 1952).
10. See, e.g., United States v. One 1960 Ford 4-Door Galaxie Sedan, 202 F. Supp. 841, 843
(E.D. Tenn. 1962).
11. United States v. One 1961 Cadillac Hardtop Automobile, 207 F. Supp. 693, 698-99
(E.D. Tenn. 1962).
12. People v. Reulman, 62 Cal. 2d 92, 396 P.2d 706, 709, 41 Cal. Rptr. 290, 293 (1964).
13. Orignet v. United States, 125 U.S. 240, 246-47 (1888); see Waterloo Distilling Corp. v.
United States, 282 U.S. 577, 581 (1931).
14. See United States v. United States Coin and Currency, 401 U.S. 715,718,721-22 (1971)
(proceeding to forfeit money used in violation of internal revenue laws requiring registration
and payment of gambling tax); One Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 700-01
(1965) (proceedings to forfeit automobile used to illegally transport intoxicating liquors).
15. Doherty v. United States, 500 F.2d 540, 544-45 (Ct. Cl. 1974); accord, Bramble v.
Richardson, 498 F.2d 968, 970-73 (10th Cir. 1974) (civil action in which reasonable doubt
standard does not apply); United States v. One 1969 Plymouth Fury, 476 F.2d 960, 961 (5th
Cir. 1973) (implying that the only recourse is remission or mitigation at the Secretary's
discretion).
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As the court's remarks indicate, a determination that forfeiture is
criminal and punitive in nature normally will assure claimants the
important constitutional protections available to an accused in a
criminal action; a contrary determination will result in a denial of
those safeguards.
Punishment and deterrence, however, cannot justify the forfeiture
of property that is owned or in which legal title is held by an inno-
cent third party. The Supreme Court, in reviewing this argument
in Van Oster v. Kansas," identified a third justification for forfei-
tures, one which allows the Court to smooth over the constitutional
problems raised by the forfeiture of an innocent owner's property.
There the Court upheld the constitutionality of a state forfeiture of
an automobile carrying illegal whiskey, although the automobile
was used without the owner's knowledge or consent. Kansas had not
denied the innocent claimant substantive due process, said the
Court, because:
[C]ertain uses of property may be regarded as so undesirable
that the owner surrenders his control at his peril. The law thus
builds a secondary defense against a forbidden use and precludes
evasions by dispensing with the necessity of judicial inquiry as to
collusion between the wrongdoer and the alleged innocent
owner."
This necessity to discourage "undesirable" uses of property has
led the Supreme Court since Van Oster to uphold other forfeiture
statutes against charges by innocent claimants that their constitu-
tional right to substantive due process has been violated.,, In so
doing the Court has relied on the rationale that the action is in rem,
that is, a suit by the government against the property sought to be
forfeited.'9 Thus the Court has adopted the fiction that "[i]t is the
16. 272 U.S. 465 (1926).
17. Id. at 467-68.
18. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 679-80 (1974)
(possession of marijuana aboard pleasure yacht); Various Items of Personal Property v.
United States, 282 U.S. 577, 581 (1931) (evading tax levied on distilled spirits diverted to
beverage purposes); Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 510-11 (1921)
(transporting liquor to evade tax). See also United States v. One 1970 Buick Riviera, 463 F.2d
1168, 1171 (5th Cir. 1972) (transportation of heroin). But see United States v. One 1974
Mercury Cougar XR7, 397 F. Supp. 1325, 1329 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (transportation of heroin);
United States v. One 1971 Ford Truck, 346 F. Supp. 613, 621 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (sale of
contraband firearm).
19. The earliest expression of this legal fiction occurred in The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12
664 [Vol. 19:661
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property which is proceeded against, and. . . held guilty and con-
demndd as though it were conscious instead of inanimate and insen-
tient.""0 Because due process is a personal right not enjoyed by an
individual's property," an innocent claimant's legal rights are not
violated by a forfeiture.12
On other occasions the Supreme Court has refused to consider
substantive due process issues because of its determination that
forfeitures, are fixed too firmly in the legislative scheme to be dis-
lodged. 3 Lower courts, in turn, have relied on this precedent in
upholding the constitutionality of forfeiture statutes.24 Some courts,
though, have avoided the issue altogether by holding that the
owner's or lienholder's title to the property is voided immediately
upon the commission of the illegal act.2 The forfeiture proceeding
Wheat.) 1 (1827). There Chief Justice Marshall reviewed the common law concept of forfei-
ture and distinguished it from the statutory in rem proceeding on the basis of the fiction that
the in rem action was concerned only with the thing to be forfeited: the government was
proceeding against the property, not against the owner or interest-holder. The dispositive
question for the Court in The Palmyra, therefore, was whether the property had offended the
laws of the land. If so, it would be forfeited to the government. The fiction continued in this
form, see, e.g., Origet v. United States, 125 U.S. 240 (1888); Dobbins v. United States, 96
U.S. 395 (1877); United States v. The Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210 (1841), until
1921, when the Court re-examined the fiction in Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254
U.S. 505 (1921). This time the Court found legislative support for the fiction, concluding that
Congress had assigned a personality, "a power of complicity and guilt in the wrong," to the
chattel. Id. at 510. Because the property had had a part in the criminal activity, it could be
found "guilty" by a jury and, by way of punishment, would be forfeited to the government.
Again the Court dismissed the due process challenge, emphasizing the traditional nature of
forfeiture: "[The forfeiture of personal property] is too firmly fixed in the punitive and
remedial jurisprudence of this country to be now displaced." Id. at 511.
20. Various Items of Personal Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 577, 581 (1931). Regard-
ing the rights of innocent lienholders, one court has extended the fiction: "It is as if the
obligation became worthless by virtue of the execution of the debtor for a crime." United
States v. One 1962 Ford Thunderbird, 232 F. Supp. 1019, 1022 (N.D. Ill. 1964).
21. United States v. One 1951 Cadillac Sedan, 107 F. Supp. 491, 492 (W.D. Okla. 1952),
aff'd. sub nom. City Nat'l Bank v. United States, 207 F.2d 741 (10th Cir. 1953).
22. Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 513 (1921); see Dobbins v. United
States, 96 U.S. 395, 399-400 (1877).
23. See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. United States, 286 U.S. 49, 56-57 (1932);
Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 511 (1921).
24. United States v. One 1969 Plymouth Fury, 476 F.2d 960, 961 (5th Cir. 1973); United
States v. One 1970 Buick Rivera, 463 F.2d 1168, 1170 (5th Cir. 1972); Associates Inv. Co. v.
United States, 220 F.2d 885, 888 (5th Cir. 1955).
25. United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1, 16 (1890); Gelston v. Hoyt, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.)
245, 310 (1818); United States v. 1960 Bags of Coffee, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 398, 403, 405 (1814);
United States v. Pacific Fin. Corp., 110 F.2d 732, 733 (2d Cir. 1940). But see United States
v. $22,993 in Currency, 332 F. Supp. 1277, 1279 (E.D. La. 1971) (when property itself is not
contraband, the mere seizure of the property does not convey ownership).
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is merely the means by which the government perfects its title to
the property.
Recently, the Supreme Court has entertained several direct at-
tacks upon the constitutionality of the forfeiture laws, the more
important of these being mounted by innocent parties deprived of
their property. In 1974 in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing
Co.," the Court reviewed the forfeiture of a yacht owned by an
innocent claimant-lessor. Pursuant to a Puerto Rican statute2l mod-
eled after federal law, the yacht was seized when the Coast Guard
found marijuana on board. Despite the minor amount of marijuana
discovered 8 and the lack of proof that the vessel had been engaged
in smuggling, the Court upheld the statute's constitutionality based
upon what it determined to be a legitimate legislative goal, to fur-
ther the statute's deterrent and punitive purposes by making illegal
behavior unprofitable. 29 The Court was not impressed with the les-
sor's due process argument, in effect, suggesting that the company
was not truly innocent: "To the extent that such forfeiture provi-
sions are applied to lessors, bailors, or secured creditors who are
innocent of any wrongdoing, confiscation may have the desirable
effect of inducing them to exercise greater care in transferring pos-
session of their property.""0
The claimant-lessor of the yacht also contended that, as the Court
had observed three years earlier in United States v. United States
Coin and Currency,31 the forfeiture statutes were enacted only "to
impose a penalty upon those who [were] significantly involved in
a criminal enterprise. '32 Because the government could not show
that the owner of the yacht was criminally involved, the claimant
argued that the forfeiture constituted a denial of due process. Al-
though support for this argument also could be found in several
earlier lower court decisions, 33 the Court distinguished Coin and
26. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
27. P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 24, § 2512(a)(4), (b) (Supp. 1973); tit. 34, § 1722 (1971).
28. 416 U.S. at 693 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 686-87.
30. Id. at 687-88 (citation omitted).
31. 401 U.S. 715 (1971).
32. Id. at 721-22.
33. See, e.g., United States v. One 1969 Buick Riviera, 358 F. Supp. 358, 359 (S.D. Fla.
1973), rev'd, 493 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1974) (dismissal of criminal charge bars forfeiture action
on same operative facts - relying on "significant involvement" language of Coin &
Currency); Suhomlin v. United States, 345 F. Supp. 650, 654 (D. Md. 1972) (no showing of
[Vol. 19:661
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Currency on the ground that it concerned the self-incrimination
provision of the fifth amendment, not the due process guarantees:
"Thus, Coin & Currency did not overrule prior decisions that sus-
tained application to innocents of forfeiture statutes, like the Puerto
Rican statutes, not limited in application to persons 'significantly
involved in a criminal enterprise.' ",34 The Court, however, did con-
firm the existence of a strong due process argument to forfeiture
statutes:
It . . .has been implied that it would be difficult to reject the
constitutional claim of an owner whose property subjected to
forfeiture had been taken from him without his privity or con-
sent. . . Similarly, the same might be said of an owner who
proved not only that he was uninvolved in and unaware of the
wrongful activity, but also that he had done all that reasonably
could be expected to prevent the proscribed use of his property;
for, in that circumstance, it would be difficult to conclude that
forfeiture served legitimate purposes and was not unduly oppres-
sive."
Future due process challenges, then, may be based on the non-
consent and reasonable investigation arguments, even though the
particular statute does not specifically protect the innocent party
when his property is taken without his "consent or privity" or when
a reasonable investigation of the possessor's record and reputation
is made.3" At present, only in those jurisdictions with statutes that
require reasonable investigations has the question ever arisen.
Moreover, even when the statute requires that the property be re-
turned to the owner if the possessor acquired the vehicle in violation
of state law, the majority of courts have held that mere lack of
consent is insufficient to avoid forfeiture.3 7
Whether future challenges to forfeiture statutes based on the dic-
knowledge or willfulness in failing to pay liquor tax, therefore no "significant criminal in-
volvement").
34. 416 U.S. at 688.
35. Id. at 689-90 (citations omitted).
36. But see United States v. One 1972 Toyota Mark II, 505 F.2d 1162, 1165 (8th Cir. 1974)
("The innocence, noninvolvement or lack of negligence of the owner in allowing the vehicle
to be used for the forfeitable offense is no defense to the forfeiture action.") (citations omit-
ted).
37. See, e.g., United States v. One 1951 Oldsmobile Sedan, 135 F. Supp. 873 (E.D. Pa.
1955).
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tum in Calero-Toledo will be successful is a matter of speculation.38
It is abundantly clear, however, that a constitutional attack upon a
federal statute must rest upon firmer ground than merely the inno-
cence of the claimant.
In contrast, a number of state courts have held that the claim-
ant's innocence is a sufficient defense but not without some judicial
embellishment of the legislatures' handiwork.39 To escape wholesale
rescission of all forfeiture acts, these state courts have simply read
a scienter element into the statutes. For example, in In re One 1965
Ford Mustang," the Supreme Court of Arizona held that the statute
implicitly required proof that the owner had "some connection with
the unlawful act, or intended to permit the automobile to be used
by a third person in the commission of the unlawful act, or had
knowledge it was to be so used."41-Because the forfeiture statute was
penal in nature, the court noted, a scienter requirement must be
implied to prevent the law from being unconstitutionally arbitrary
and unreasonable.42 Thus, even though the owner of the vehicle had
given the accused permission to use the car, as she had no knowl-
edge that it would be used to transport marijuana, the court ordered
that her car be returned.
This comparison of Ford Mustang and Calero-Toledo demon-
strates how different policy considerations may affect the determi-
nation whether a statute offends due process requirements. The
United States Supreme Court has sided with those who believe that
deterring potential offenders by denying them their means of trans-
portation outweighs other policies that might support the due pro-
cess arguments asserted successfully in Ford Mustang.4 3 Thus, the
38. In United States v. One 1974 Mercury Cougar XR7, 397 F. Supp. 1325 (C.D. Cal. 1975),
the court relied upon the reasonable investigatior defense implied in Calero-Toledo. In
Mercury Cougar an innocent claimant had filed a petitition for remission or mitigation that
was denied by the Attorney-General. The government argued that, therefore, the district
court was without jurisdiction to decide the question. See notes 68-85 infra & accompanying
text. The court, however, summarily disposed of the government's contention and, relying
heavily on the Calero-Toledo dictum, held that the Attorney General's denial of the petition
was an unconstitutional breach of the just compensation requirement of the fifth amendment.
397 F. Supp. at 1329.
39. See, e.g., In Re One 1965 Ford Mustang, 105 Ariz. 293, -, 463 P.2d 827, 834 (1970).
See Annot., 50 A.L.R.3d 170 (1973) for a compilation of state decisions regarding forfeitures
for violations of state narcotics laws.
40. 105 Ariz. 293, 463 P.2d 827 (1970).
41. Id. at 293, 463 P.2d at 834.
42. Id.
43. Cf. Hamilton v. Kentucky Distillers Co., 251 U.S. 146, 155-58 (1919) (prohibition of
[Vol. 19:661
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Supreme Court construes these statutes as a constitutional exercise
of the government's police power, but the Calero-Toledo dictum
concerning consent and reasonable investigation may give innocent
third parties solace in future cases.
PROCEDURE UNDER MODERN FORFEITURE STATUTES
Today forfeiture is a civil action4 brought in rem against the
property.45 Most forfeitures occur for violations of the internal reve-
nue laws,46 for the transportation of controlled substances, including
narcotics,"7 and for the transportation of contraband, including nar-
cotic drugs, firearms, and counterfeit money.48 Vessels, vehicles, and
aircraft used to violate customs laws frequently are forfeited," as are
the items smuggled into the country. Property used in connection
with violations of the gambling,5 ' wagering, 52 and firearms 53 laws
also is subject to forfeitures. The following discussion of the statu-
tory defenses and remedies available to one whose property has been
seized and the applicable burden of proof focuses primarily on for-
feitures under the Controlled Substances and Transportation of
Contraband Acts.5
Remedies: Petition or Contest?
Forfeiture actions are commenced upon the seizure of the prop-
erty. The seizing officer submits his report to the United States
Attorney for the district in which the alleged criminal act occurred 5
liquor traffic without providing just compensation is valid under United States' war powers).
44. See United States v. Amore, 335 F.2d 329, 331 (7th Cir. 1964); United States v. One
1960 Ford 4-Door Galaxie Sedan, 202 F. Supp. 841, 843 (E.D. Tenn. 1962); United States v.
Cato Bros., Inc., 175 F. Supp. 811, 814 (E.D. Va.), rev'd, 273 F.2d 153 (4th Cir. 1959).
45. See Florida Dealers and Growers Bank v. United States, 279 F.2d 673, 677 (5th Cir.
1960); United States v. Bleasby, 257 F.2d 278, 280-81 (3d. Cir. 1958); United States v. One
1955 Cadillac Eldorado Convertible, 148 F. Supp. 752, 754 (E.D. Ill. 1957).
46. 26 U.S.C. § 7302 (1970).
47. 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1970).
48. 49 U.S.C. § 781 (1970).
49. 19 U.S.C. § 1595a (1970).
50. 18 U.S.C. § 545 (1970).
51. 18 U.S.C. § 1955(d) (1970).
52. 26 U.S.C. § 4412 (1970).
53. 18 U.S.C. § 924 (1970).
54. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 5601-5693 (1970 & Supp. 1 1977); 19 U.S.C. § 1595a-1618 (1970 &
Supp. 11977); 49 U.S.C. §§ 781-788 (1970 & Supp. 1 1977).
55. 19 U.S.C. § 1603 (1970).
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and appraises the value of the property 6 at its domestic value, the
"retail price at which such property is freely offered for sale. 57
This appraisal is critical as it dictates the character of the ensuing
forfeiture proceedings. If the property's estimated value is greater
than $2,500 a full condemnation hearing must be held in federal
district court, 8 unless the United States Attorney decides that the
forfeiture cannot be sustained or that the "ends of the public jus-
tice" do not require prosecution.59 In that event the United States
Attorney must advise the Secretary of the Treasury of his decision
and await directions. 0 If the appraised value is $2,500 or less, sum-
mary forfeiture proceedings will be initiated. The custodian of the
property must publish in a newspaper within the judicial district
notice of his intention to forfeit the items seized.' If within twenty
days of the first publication of the notice of seizure a party files a
claim disclosing his interest in the property with the custodian 2 and
the claimant posts a $250 bond conditioned on the payment of all
costs and expenses of the proceedings if condemnation is made, 13
then the summary forfeiture proceeding is halted, and a hearing in
federal court is permitted. 4 The custodian then transmits the claim
to the United States Attorney for the purpose of "proceeding to a
condemnation of the property. '6 5
Before the sale of the property, as an alternative to contesting the
forfeiture, a claimant may file a petition for remission or mitigation
56. Id. § 1606.
57. 21 C.F.R. § 1316.74 (1977).
58. 19 U.S.C. § 1610 (1970).
59. Id. § 1604.
60. Id.
61. See id. § 1607; 21 C.F.R. § 1316.75 (1977). On their face, the regulations conflict with
the statute's publication requirements. The customs statute requires publication for "three
successive weeks," 19 U.S.C. § 1607 (1970), while the regulations set forth that the notice shall
be published "once a week for at least three successive weeks." 21 C.F.R. § 1316.75 (1977).
Moreover, the custom statutes carry less protection for the absent claimant than do the
internal revenue laws. Under the latter rules, a notice of forfeiture must be more specific,
including information about the articles seized and the time, place and cause of seizure.
Internal revenue laws also allow claimants thirty days after the first publication within which
to appear and press their claim. 26 U.S.C. § 7325(2) (1970).
62. 19 U.S.C. § 1608 (1970); 21 C.F.R. § 1316.75(b) (1977).
63. Id.
64. 21 C.F.R. § 1316.76(b) (1977). Cf. In re C.I.T. Corp., 28 F.2d 50, 52 (N.D.N.Y. 1928)
(automobile forfeited because owner failed to file cost bond which would have brought auto-
mobile under the court's jurisdiction).
65. 21 C.F.R. § 1316.76 (1977).
[Vol. 19:661
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with the Secretary of the Treasury.6 The Secretary, however, has
delegated this authority to the Justice Department, which must
prosecute the action, if contested, but may return the property if not
contested. Often the property will be returned to the party if there
is an outstanding lien or mortgage or if the owner is truly innocent
and without knowledge of its illegal use. Once a remedy is chosen,
the election, with few exceptions, is final." Thus, an examination
of the procedure and effects of both alternatives is imperative to
determine which will be most advantageous to a particular claim-
ant.
The Petition for Remission or Mitigation
The remedy sought most often by innocent parties and lienhold-
ers who have property interests subject to forfeiture is the petition
for remission or mitigation. But in electing this remedy the claimant
narrows significantly his bases of attack upon the forfeiture. In fact,
filing a petition presumes a valid forfeiture, and, therefore, the
government will not consider challenges to the constitutionality of
the statute, the legality of the search, nor the claim that the sub-
stance found was not an illegal substance. Nor does it matter that
the claimant was unaware of the unlawful substance.
The procedure under the Controlled Substances and Transporta-
tion Acts is very technical and confusing because of the gamut of
laws and regulations controlling these petitions.69 Basically, a sworn
66. 19 U.S.C. § 1618 (1970).
67. In one case the claimant-lienholder filed a petition for remission and mitigation and
also proceeded to contest. A libel was filed by the United States, and before the case was
adjudicated the petition for remission was denied. The court indicated, in denying "relief, that
the petition in remission was the innocent lienholder's only hope. United States v. One
1955 Ford Sedan, 164 F. Supp. 729, 738 (D. Md. 1958); accord, United States v. One 1961
Cadillac, 337 F.2d 730, 732 (6th Cir. 1964). As stated elsewhere:
The courts have held that "an election to proceed by petition for remission or
mitigation of forfeiture rather than by claim with the requisite bond binds the
plaintiff to the available administrative remedies; and the administrative
method is exclusive."
After the plaintiff elects the administrative remedy, the law is clear that he
is foreclosed from the District Courts.
Branble v. Kleindienst, 357 F. Supp. 1028, 1033 (D. Colo. 1973) (quoting Jary Leasing
Corp. v. United States, 254 F: Supp. 157, 159 (E.D.N.Y. 1966)) (citations omitted) (emphasis
in original).
68. 28 C.F.R. § 9.5(b) (1976).
69. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1613, 1618 (1970); 21 C.F.R. §§ 1316.79 to 1316.81 (1977); 28 C.F.R.
§§ 9.4 to 9.7 (1976).
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petition, containing a documented description of the property and
the interest of the petitioner and setting forth the facts and circum-
stances that justify remission or mitigation, must be filed in tripli-
cate. 0 This procedure is available only if the petitioner can establish
a valid interest in the property and further show that he was without
knowledge or reason to believe that the property was being or would
be used in violation of the law and that he at no time had knowledge
or reason to believe that the operator had a criminal record or a
reputation for violating the law.7' But even though statutory re-
quirements have been met, remission or mitigation is granted only
by the grace of the Secretary or his delegate and is not reviewable,
7 2
even for an alleged abuse of discretion. 3 The Secretary may remit
the property, if he finds that the "forfeiture was incurred without
willful negligence or without any intention on the part of the peti-
tioner to defraud the revenue or to violate the law, or finds the
existence of such mitigating circumstances as to justify the remis-
sion. . . . "71 Agency regulations have illuminated these statutory
requirements, setting out explicitly what standards must be met
before remission will be granted. 75, If the claimant does not satisfy
these conditions, though, he still may show that circumstances war-
rant at least a mitigation of the forfeiture. Thus, the Secretary may
70. Id. § 9.5(a).
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., United States v. One 1972 Mercedes-Benz 250, 545 F.2d 1233, 1236 (9th Cir.
1976); United States v. One 1970 Buick Riviera, 463 F.2d 1168, 1170 (5th Cir.), cert. denied
sub noma. National Am. Bank of New Orleans v. United States, 409 U.S. 980 (1972); United
States v. One 1961 Cadillac, 337 F.2d 730, 733 (6th Cir. 1964); Bramble v. Kleindienst, 357
F. Supp. 1028, 1033-34 (D. Colo. 1973), aff[d on other grounds, 498 F.2d 968 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1069 (1974); United States v. One 1957 Buick Roadmaster, 167 F. Supp. 597,
601 (E.D. Mich. 1958).
73. See, e.g., United States v. One 1961 Cadillac, 337 F.2d 730, 733 (6th Cir. 1964).
74. 19 U.S.C. § 1618 (1970).
75. The determining official shall not remit or mitigate a forfeiture unless the
petitioner:
(1) Establishes a valid, good faith interest in the seized property as owner or
otherwise; and
(2) Establishes that he at no time had any knowledge or reason to believe that
the property in which he claims an interest was being or would be used in a
violation of the law.
(3) Establishes that he at no time had any knowledge or reason to believe that
the owner had any record or reputation for violating the laws of the United
States or of any State for related crime.
28 C.F.R. § 9.5(c) (1976). Other more specific provisions apply to lessors, voluntary bail-
ments, rival claimants, and straw purchase transactions. Id. § 9.6.
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consider the presence of a prior lien or mortgage, whether the owner
was involved in the scheme, and whether the possessor acquired the
property legally.
A conflict exists between the statute and the regulations concern-
ing the time within which the petition must be filed. Section 1618
of the Act provides that the petition may be filed at any time before
the sale of the property. A regulation, however, provides that the
petition shoild be filed within 30 days of the seizure. 6 In addition,
at least one federal court has indicated that the petition should be
filed after the forfeiture. 7 In any event, an attorney should file his
client's petition within 30 days of seizure as required by the regula-
tions to be certain of protecting his client's rights.
After the time for filing has expired, the government may sell or
dispose of the property. This leaves the petitioner the remedy set
out in title 19, section 1613 of the United States Code, which pro-
vides that any person claiming an interest in property forfeited and
sold may petition the appropriate authority within three months
after the sale for a restoration of his interest from the proceeds. The
standards are basically the same as in pre-sale petitions for remis-
sion or mitigation, with the significant exception that the applicant
must show that he did not know and was not in a position to know
of the seizure prior to the forfeiture.7 8
Assuming that the petition for remission or mitigation fails, the
general rule is that a request for judicial review will fail for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. 71 Shortly after the passage of the Ad-
76. 21 C.F.R. § 1316.80 (1977).
77. United States v. One 1973 Dodge Maxivan Truck, 365 F. Supp. 833, 835 (N.D. Fla.
1973) (premature filing).
78. 19 U.S.C. § 1613 (1970). Section 7237 of the I.R.C. provides that the law applicable
"to the remissions or mitigation by the Secretary . . . of forfeiture under the customs laws
shall apply to forfeitures incurred. . . under the internal revenue laws." An exception to this
rule exists when the proceeding is in court against vehicles or airplanes and the violation is
under the revenue laws dealing with transportation of illegal liquor. In that event the court
has exclusive jurisdiction to remit or mitigate the forfeiture once decreed. I.R.C. § 3617. The
claimant must prove his interest, that he had no knowledge or reason to believe that the
vehicle would be used in violation of the liquor laws, and that the user of the vehicle or
airplane did not have a record or reputation for violating the liquor laws before the claimant
acquired his interest. If the petition is allowed and the value exceeds the claimant's interest,
the property will be delivered to the claimant. Prior to the court's adjudication the claimant
may post a bond with acceptable sureties and regain possession of the property pending the
outcome of the litigation.
79. See, e.g., United States v. One 1961 Cadillac Hardtop Automobile, 207 F. Supp. 693,
700 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).
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ministrative Procedure Act (APA), 0 which provides for judicial re-
view of many agency decisions, review of a decision by the Secretary
was sought in United States v. One 1961 Cadillac." The Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit determined that, because the APA did
not provide for review when the applicable statute stated that the
agency's decision was discretionary, 2 the failure to grant remission
or mitigation was not reviewable under any circumstances.83 A lower
court in the same circuit had held to the same effect six years
earlier" and later decisions have been in accord.85
An interesting exception to this rule arose in Pasha v. United
States."5 Pasha, convicted of defrauding the government in connec-
tion with the payment of certain gambling taxes, was sentenced to
prison and in a separate action forfeited his automobile. In a coram
nobiss7 proceeding, he applied to have his conviction reversed and
the car or its value returned, relying on the Supreme Court holdings
in Marchetti v. United States" and Grosso v. United States." In
those cases the Court held that statutes requiring the filing of cer-
tain gambling tax returns violated a defendant's fifth amendment
right against self-incrimination. Pasha's criminal conviction subse-
quently was reversed and, because the evidence upon which the
forfeiture was based was identical to that introduced in the criminal
80. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1009 (1970).
81. 337 F.2d 730 (6th Cir. 1964).
82. Id. at 732.
83. Id. at 733.
84. United States v. One 1957 Buick Roadmaster, 167 F. Supp. 597, 601 (E.D. Mich. 1958).
85. See, e.g., Pullman Trust & Sav. Bank v. United States, 225 F. Supp. 860 (N.D. Ill.
1964). Contra, United States v. One 1974 Mercury Cougar XR7, 397 F. Supp. 1325 (C.D. Cal.
1975). In Mercury Cougar the court relied on Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402 (1971), in which the Supreme Court maintained that the "committed to agency
action" exception of the APA was very narrow and applied only "in those rare instances where
statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply." Id. at
410. The district court held that that statute, 19 U.S.C. § 1618 (Supp. 1977), delegating
authority to remit certain forfeitures, did not fall within this narrow exception because the
phrases "without willful negligence" and "without any intention on the part of the petitioner
to defraud the revenue or to violate the law" provide identifiable standards and guidelines
constituting "law to apply". 397 F. Supp. at 1331. The court distinguished United States v.
One 1961 Cadillac, 337 F.2d 730 (6th Cir. 1964), as having been decided before Overton Park
and therefore not binding. 397 F. Supp at 1332.
86. 484 F.2d 630 (7th Cir. 1973).
87. ('orum nobib is a writ of error directed to another branch of the same court. BLACK'S
LAW DICriONARY 406 (Rev. 4th Ed. 1968).
88. 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
89. 390 U.S. 62 (1968).
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case, the court ordered the value of Pasha's car paid to him by the
government."
A variant of judicial review also may be obtained if the Secretary
or his authorized delegate fails or refuses to act. An order of manda-
mus may be sought in federal district court to compel the Secretary
to respond to a petition for remission or mitigation.9' Mandamus
also is available if the Secretary fails to act in the erroneous belief
that he is without authority to act;92 however, mandamus is not
available in any other circumstances. 3
In United States v. Decker,94 a criminal action, the claimant
moved for the return of his property pursuant to Rule 41(e) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides for the return
of property seized upon the initiation of criminal actions. 5 The
government's administrative forfeiture proceeding was in abeyance,
pending a final determination of the claimant's guilt or innocence
on appeal from his conviction. The court held that the appeal di-
vested it of jurisdiction to determine a motion that necessarily de-
pended upon the finality of the conviction.96 Because of its special
90. 484 F.2d 633. Although not a coram nobis proceeding, the United States Supreme Court
decision in United States v. United States Coin and Currancy, 401 U.S. 715 (1971), was the
basis for the holding. Accord, United States v. One Olivetti-Underwood Electric Adding
Machine, 443 F.2d 372 (5th Cir. 1971) (money and property seized for violation of gambling
tax law required to be returned when fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination
was invoked); United States v. One 1967 Ford Thunderbird, 441 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1971)
(forfeiture of automobile against leinholder barred when forfeiture of owner's interest in
automobile would result in violation of owner's privilege against self-incrimination). But see
United States v. 20 "Dealer's Choice" Machines, 483 F.2d 474,477 (4th Cir. 1973), which held
that the fifth amendment was not a bar to forfeiture of mechanical poker machines for failure
to pay tax imposed on gaming devices. The court reasoned that the tax was not directed at a
small group of persons whose activities are inherently suspect, id. at 476, thus distinguishing
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968) (fifth amendment objection to tax on wagering
when wagering was prohibited by state criminal statutes). The court also based its decision
on the absence of any evidence that compliance with the federal tax statute would raise a
substantial danger of incrimination under state statutes, as it was the congressional purpose
that such information be confidential. 483 F.2d at 476.
91. United States v. Edwards, 368 F.2d 722, 724 (4th Cir. 1966); Contonificio Bustese, S.A.
v. Morgenthau, 121 F.2d 884, 886 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
92. United States v. One 1970 Buick Riviera, 463 F.2d 1168, 1170 (5th Cir. 1972).
93. Id.
94. 322 F. Supp. 419 (W.D. Mo. 1970).
95. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e) (1972).
96. 322 F. Supp. at 423. See also United States v. Rapp, 539 F.2d 1156, 1160 (8th Cir. 1976),
in which the court held that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain a motion for the return of
property under Rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The court found Rule
41(e) insufficient to provide a jurisdictional basis for two reasons: first, the rule does not apply
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fact situation, however, Decker does not preclude future attempts
by a claimant to have non-contraband property returned under Rule
41 in a criminal action, especially if he is acquitted or if the property
was seized illegally.
An additional remedy for the aggrieved claimant is created by the
Tucker Act, 9 which grants federal district courts subject matter
jurisdiction over actions against the United States, provided the
amount in controversy is less than $10,000 and the claim is based
on the Constitution or a law of the United States. 8 Thus, the claim-
ant whose challenge is constitutional in nature may bypass the peti-
tion for remission or mitigation and proceed directly into district
court without having to post a cost bond.
An alternative to proceeding under the Tucker Act if the basis for
the action is either constitutional or statutory is to bring suit against
the United States in the Court of Claims. 9 Although counsel usually
will be required to appear in Washington, D.C., this remedy is at-
tractive because direct appeal to the Supreme Court is possible.
Moreover, actions brought in the Court of Claims are not limited to
damages of $10,000 or less as are actions brought pursuant to the
Tucker Act.
Contested Forfeitures: The Government's Burden of Proof
Although forfeiture is a civil in rem action,' 0 many courts ac-
to civil forfeitures of property resulting from a statutory violation; and second, it provides a
method of suppressing evidence prior to trial and does not augment the defendant's rights
after conviction. Id. In this case, Rapp did not file his motion until after his sentencing.
97. Tucker Act of 1887, ch. 359, 29 Stat. 505 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
98. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1970). Jurisdiction over constitutional issues also may be ob-
tained under 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970). See Lee v. Thornton, 398 F. Supp. 970, 976 (D. Vt.
1975), aff'd, 538 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1976). The court held that, based on § 1361, which grants
jurisdiction over any action compelling an officer of the United States to perform his duty, it
had authority to determine the scope of any constitutional duty that the defendant owed to
the plaintiffs.
99. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1970) provides in pertinent part:
The Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any
claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any
Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any
express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliqui-
dated damages in cases not sounding in tort.
This duplicates the language of the Tucker Act, with the exception that there is no $10,000
limit specified here. See Doherty v. United States, 500 F.2d 540, 542 (Ct. Cl. 1974) (monetary
claim against the United States based on deprivation of property without compensation).
100. United States v. One 1960 Ford 4-Door Galaxie Sedan, 202 F. Supp. 841, 843 (E.D.
Tenn. 1962).
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knowledge the resemblance between forfeiture and criminal pro-
ceedings.'"' To avoid confusion over whether the civil "prepon-
derance of the evidence" or the criminal "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard should apply, some forfeiture statutes have
clarified the burden of proof issue.102 Most require the government
to show "probable cause" that the property has been employed in
a manner which contravenes the statute. Forfeitures pursuant to
less common statutes only require that the government meet the
preponderance of the evidence test. 03 Normally, however, once
probable cause has been demonstrated, the burden shifts to the
claimant to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the prop-
erty was not used illegally. 04 Proof of intent is not necessary.' 5
Apparently, "probable cause" requires the same showing in forfei-
ture cases as is necessary to establish the validity of an arrest or
search warrant: the cause must be reasonable under the circumstan-
ces.ss According to at least one decision, the government must show
circumstances that establish more than a mere suspicion but less
than a prima facie case.'07 In other decisions courts have requested
only that the government demonstrate something less than a prima
facie case.'"8 Even hearsay alone may be enough to demonstrate
probable cause.' 9 No minimum quantum of proof, however, is es-
101. See, e.g., United States v. Cato Bros., Inc., 175 F. Supp. 811, 814 (E.D. Va.), rev'd
on other grounds, 273 F.2d 153 (4th Cir. 1959).
102. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (1970); Associates Inv. Co. v. United States, 220 F.2d 885,
887 (5th Cir. 1955) (once probable cause has been established for forfeiture of vehicle carrying
contraband, burden of proof shifts to claimant to show by a preponderance of evidence that
the violation was committed while the automobile was in the possession of one who acquired
it illegally); United States v. Andrade, 181 F.2d 42, 46 (9th Cir. 1950) (burden on claimant
to show illegal possession).
103. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 7302 (1970).
104. See, e.g., United States v. One 1963 Cadillac Hardtop, 231 F. Supp. 27, 28-29 (E:D.
Wis. 1964). But see 26 U.S.C. § 7302 (1970) (forfeitures involving illegal gambling). This
statute requires the government to establish its case by a preponderance of the evidence.
D'Agostino v. United States, 261 F.2d 154, 157 (9th Cir. 1958); United States v. One 1955
Mercury Sedan, 242 F.2d 429, 430 (4th Cir. 1957).
105. One Lot of Emerald Cut Stones and One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 234
(1972).
106. Bush v. United States, 389 F.2d 485, 489 (5th Cir. 1958); United States v. One 1973
Pontiac Grand Am, 413 F. Supp. 163, 165 (W.D. Tex. 1976).
107. United States v. One 1955 Ford Sedan, 164 F. Supp. 729, 736 (D. Md. 1958).
108. See United States v. One 1949 Pontiac Sedan, 194 F.2d 756, 759 (7th Cir. 1952);
United States v. Davidson, 50 F.2d 517, 520 (1st Cir. 1931); United States v. Blackwood, 47
F.2d 849, 851 (1st Cir. 1931).
109. People v. Macias, 39 Ill. 2d 208, 234 N.E.2d 783, 787 (1968) (armed robbery); see
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tablished clearly in these decisions."'
A property owner who pleads guilty to the associated criminal
charge has little reason to challenge the forfeiture, having conceded
probable cause in his plea. Likewise with the claimant who has been
convicted. But when the claimant-owner of forfeited property has
been found innocent, then the disparity in burdens of proof placed
upon the government works to the innocent claimant-owner's disad-
vantage.
The defendant-owner's acquittal on the criminal charge may be
of no avail to the beneficial owner in the ensuing forfeiture proceed-
ing,' in which the burden upon the government is merely to show
probable cause. Criminal acquittal may show only that the govern-
ment did not meet the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard, and
because indictment alone demonstrates a strong degree of probable
cause, forfeiture is still conceivable following criminal acquittal of
the accused or dismissal of the action on a motion of no case to
answer. This rule is harsh on truly innocent parties, such as lien-
holders, lessors, and others who had no knowledge of the criminal
activity in which the property was involved."' To recover his prop-
erty the claimant must assert and prove one of several specific sta-
United States v. One 1955 Ford Sedan, 164 F. Supp. 729, 736 (D. Md. 1958) (statements of
owner of automobile admissible as constituting probable cause for seizure). The Eighth Cir-
cuit has taken an even stronger position:
We have no doubt that information of guilt, even though hearsay and incompe-
tent with respect to the merits of a case ... may constitute probable cause or,
in other words, a reasonable grounds for belief in guilt, justifying the institution
of the [forfeiture] action. Any other rule would seem to be illogical, unrealistic,
and opposed to everyday human experience.
Ted's Motors, Inc. v. United States, 217 F.2d 777, 780-81 (8th Cir. 1954).
110 In United States v. One Buick Sedan, 231 F.2d 219 (3d Cir. 1955), the court came close
to disclosing, at least for its purposes, what might constitute minimum probable cause:
IProbable causel has come to mean more than bare suspicion. [It] exists
where "the facts and circumstances within their (the officers') knowledge and
of which they had reasonably trustworthy information (are) sufficient in them-
selves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that" an offense has
been or is being committed.
Id. at 221-22 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)). See also United
States v. One 1967 Buick Riviera, 439 F.2d 92 (9th Cir. 1971) (evidence sufficient to warrant
a reasonable belief that a vehicle was used in violation of the statute).
111. Cf. Murphy v. United States, 272 U.S. 630, 632 (1926) (acquittal on criminal charge
of maintaining a nuisance did not bar government from proving a nuisance existed in an
abatement suit in equity).
112. The innocent lienholder-claimant in United States v. One 1957 Lincoln Premier, 265
F.2d 734 (7th Cir. 1959), argued to no avail that the innocent party without knowledge was
at a special disadvantage and thus the burden upon him was substantially greater. Id. at 736.
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tutory defenses: that the vehicle or other property was not within
the ambit of the statutory proscription, that the claimant was a
common carrier, or that the property had been stolen from or used
without the authority of the claimant. 13 But because the claimant
usually has little knowledge of the facts and had no control over the
property, this -may be very difficult, if not impossible. He thus finds
himself in the situation described by one court:
In any event sufficient [evidence] was shown to constitute prob-
able cause for the institution of the proceedings. The burden of
the explanation, therefore, fell upon the claimant. Since it offered
no proof it failed to carry that burden and a decree of forfeiture
must, therefore, be granted."'
Clearly, access to the facts will be critical to the innocent party's
claim because a finding that the search was conducted illegally may
result in the suppression of evidence seized and the return of the
property.15
One means by which an innocent claimant may defeat the govern-
ment's showing of probable cause is to move for the suppression of
evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment's prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Whether the exclusion-
ary rule"' is applicable to forfeitures, however, is not entirely clear.
Two cases decided by the Supreme Court in 1926 have been cited
often as authority for the proposition that the exclusionary rule does
not apply to forfeiture proceedings. In Dodge v. United States,"'
the Court held that the forfeiture of a motorboat transporting li-
quor unlawfully but seized without statutory authority should not
fail because the owner suffered nothing that he would not have suf-
fered had the seizure comported with statutory process."' In United
States v. One Ford Coupe Automobile,' 9 the Court, sustaining a
contested forfeiture, implied that the fourth amendment's protec-
113. 49 U.S.C. §§ 781, 782, 784 (1970).
114. United States v. One Dodge Coupe, 43 F. Supp. 60, 62 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
115. See One Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 702 (1965) (exclusionary rule
prohibits use of evidence seized in warrantless search of automobile, without probable cause,
in forfeiture proceeding against automobile).
116. See generally, J. GEORGE, CONsTrruTONAL IAMrrTAONS ON EvIDENCE I CRIMINAL CASES
(1973); 4 C. TORCIA, WHAirrON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE §§ 718-736 (13th ed. 1973).
117. 272 U.S. 530 (1926).
118. Id. at 532.
119. 272 U.S. 321 (1926).
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tion extended only to personal rights, not to property rights.'2 Lower
courts have since interpreted Dodge and One Ford Coupe to hold
that an illegal search does not defeat an otherwise valid forfeiture.' 2'
In 1965 the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, which three
years earlier had decided that illegal search and seizure provisions
did not apply in forfeiture proceedings,' 22 determined in a split deci-
sion that an illegal seizure was in fact not a seizure at all and that,
therefore, the forfeiture could not be enforced. 12 The court relied
substantially on the early decision of Boyd v. United States'4 and
distinguished the Supreme Court's holding in Dodge.
Against this background, the issue again reached the Supreme
Court in 1965 in One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania.''
Again, Boyd was the basis for the Court's decision. Holding that the
forfeiture action, though civil in form, was in fact punitive and
therefore criminal in nature, the Court determined that the provi-
sions of the fourth amendment as applied to the states through the
fourteenth amendment required suppression of the illegally seized
evidence. Although the decision in Plymouth Sedan technically
applied only to the states, it also has been relied upon in cases
instituted by the United States.'2 The fourth amendment guarantee
120. "It is settled that, where property declared by a federal statute to be forfeited, because
used in violation of federal law is seized by one having no authority to do so, the Uniied States
may adopt the seizure with the same effect as if it had originally been made by one duly
authorized." Id. at 325 (citations omitted). See also Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102
(1933).
121. See Interbartolo v. United States, 303 F.2d 34 (1st Cir. 1962); United States v. Carey,
272 F.2d 492 (5th Cir. 1959); United States v. One 1956 Ford Tudor Sedan, 253 F.2d 725 (4th
Cir. 1958); United States v. Pacific Fin. Corp., 110 F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1940); Bourke v. United
States, 44 F.2d 371 (6th Cir. 1930); United States v. One 1955 Cadillac Eldorado Convertible,
148 F. Supp. 752 (E.D. Ill. 1957); United States v. One 1951 Cadillac Sedan, 107 F. Supp.
491 (W.D. Okla. 1952), aff'd sub nom. City Nat'l Bank v. United States, 207 F.2d 741 (10th
Cir. 1953).
Some decisions have relied on the fact that the automobile (property) lacked standing to
proceed under fourth amendment protections. See Van Dam v. United States, 23 F.2d 235
(6th Cir. 1928); Cantrell v. United States, 15 F.2d 953 (5th Cir. 1926). Others have reasoned
that upon seizure title instantly vested in the United States. See, e.g., Grogan v. United
States, 261 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1958).
122. Interbartolo v. United States, 303 F.2d 34 (1st Cir. 1962).
123. Berkowitz v. United States, 340 F.2d 168 (1st Cir. 1965).
124. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
125. 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
126. Bramble v. Richardson, 498 F.2d 968 (10th Cir. 1974) (dictum); United States v. One
1971 Lincoln Continental Mark m11, 460 F.2d 273 (8th Cir. 1972); Howard v. United States,
423 F.2d 1102 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. One 1967 Dodge Pickup Truck, 310 F. Supp.
773 (S.D. Ala. 1970).
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against unreasonable search and seizure, therefore, appears to ren-
der unenforceable the forfeiture of property seized in violation of the
fourth amendment. This defense also may be raised by innocent
claimants.127
One question apparently still unresolved is whether collateral es-
toppel applies when during the criminal proceeding the reasonable-
ness of the seizure is contested and adjudged and the issue is raised
again in the forfeiture action. In a 1949 case, United States v.
Physic, 128the accused was charged with purchasing unstamped her-
oin. At trial, he contended that the evidence was obtained illegally
and should be suppressed; his motion was denied, but he was ac-
quitted of all criminal charges. The government then filed a forfei-
ture libel against his vehicle, and again the accused moved to ex-
clude the evidence. The government argued that the legality of the
search had been decided conclusively in the criminal action and
therefore the accused was estopped from raising the issue again in
the forfeiture action. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
rejected this argument on the narrow ground that, because the rul-
ing on the motion was interlocutory and could not be appealed after
acquittal, the appellate court was not bound by the trial court's
determination that the search was reasonable. Reexamining the cir-
cumstances of the seizure, the court concluded that the evidence
should have been suppressed and that, therefore, the vehicle should
be returned.
The Court of Claims, however, in a 1974 decision, Doherty v.
United States, 12 reached a contrary but distinguishable result.
Again, in the criminal action the search was deemed to have been
legal, and, when Doherty attempted to raise the issue in the for-
feiture action, the court held that he was collaterally estopped.
Doherty thus represents something of an aberration in forfeiture
law. Although recently the Supreme Court has refused to allow the
defendant-claimant, acquitted of the criminal charges, to plead
collateral estoppel in a subsequent forfeiture proceeding,' 0 it would
appear from Doherty that a determination of the reasonableness of
127. See United States v. One 1967 Dodge Pickup Truck, 310 F. Supp. 773 (S.D. Ala. 1970).
128. 175 F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1949).
129. 500 F.2d 540 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
130. See, e.g., One Lot of Emerald Cut Stones and One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S.
232 (1972). For a discussion of this case and its implications, see text accompanying notes
256-66 infra.
1978]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:661
the search in the criminal action will carry over to the forfeiture
proceeding.' 3' Of course, if the claimant and the accused are not the
same, as in the case of the innocent lienholder, then the res judi-
cata/collateral estoppel argument loses much of its force. It is sub-
mitted that One 1958 Plymouth v. Pennsylvania, in which the Su-
preme Court permitted the reasonableness of a search to be tested
in a forfeiture case, 32 makes the law dealing with searches and sei-
zures applicable to forfeiture proceedings. 3
STATUTORY ISSUES
Before considering the constitutional issues raised by forfeiture
statutes, several preliminary issues should be analyzed: namely,
under what circumstances these statutes are violated and to what
extent the enactment and enforcement of forfeiture laws imple-
ments congressional and judicial policy. This discussion will focus
exclusively upon the provisions of the Controlled Substances and
Transportation of Contraband Acts.
131. Related questions also arise under the Doherty rationale: Is a determination in the
criminal trial that the substance involved was, in fact, marijuana binding on the court
hearing the forfeiture action? In all likelihood, such a finding would be enough for probable
cause, thus shifting the burden of proving that the substance was not contraband to the
claimant. Compare United States v. One 1963 Cadillac Hardtop, 231 F. Supp. 27 (E.D. Wis.
1974) and United States v. Lewallen, 385 F. Supp. 1140 (W.D. Wis. 1974) with United States
v. Lawson, 507 F.2d 433, 438 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1004 (1975).
132. 380 U.S. at 702. Some courts have refused the innocent lienholder standing to chal-
lenge the reasonableness of the seizure. Returning to the in rem fiction, the District Court
for the Western District of Missouri found that the petitioner-mortgagee could not challnge
the search since it had no locus standi. United States v. One 1963 Cadillac Coupe De Ville,
250 F. Supp. 183 (W.D. Mo. 1966).
Entrapment also has been held to be a personal defense and unavailable in forfeiture
actions. United States v. One 1972 Wood, 19 Foot Custom Boat, 501 F.2d 1327 (5th Cir. 1974).
133. A discussion of the development and current status of the law pertaining to searches
and seizures is beyond the scope of this Article. See Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule
in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 665 (1970). See also Baade, Illegally Obtained
Evidence in Criminal and Civil Cases: A Comparative Study of a Classic Mismatch, 51 TEX.
L. REv. 1325 (1973); Horowitz, Excluding the Exclusionary Rule- Can There be an Effective
Alternative?, 47 L.A.B. BuLL. 91 (1972); Spiotto, Search and Seizure: An Empirical Study
of the Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 243 (1973); Wright, Must
the Criminal Go Free if the Constable Blunders?, 50 TEx. L. Rsv. 736 (1972); Note, A Fedeeral
Cause of Action Against a Municipality for Fourth Amendment Violations by its Agents, 42
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 850 (1974); Note, Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Automobiles,
87 HARV. L. REv. 835 (1974); Note, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte: A New Era in Consent
Searches?, 35 U. Prrr. L. REv. 655 (1974).
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Statutory Interpretation: "Facilitate"
Under these Acts, any vehicle, vessel, or aircraft that is used to
transport, conceal or "facilitate" the transportation, possession,
purchase, sale of contraband articles, including narcotics, firearms,
and counterfeit currency, is subject to forfeiture to the United
States.'34 If the government can show that contraband was physi-
cally within the vehicle, vessel, or airplane, no problem of statutory
construction arises. If the government attempts to prove that prop-
erty was used to "facilitate" the transportation of or a transaction
in contraband articles, however, courts must determine the mean-
ing of that term in the absence of any statutory definition. Often,
courts observe that, because of their penal character, forfeitures are
not favored in the law, '35 and, consequently, the term "facilitate"
must be strictly construed.'36 This is especially true when forfeitures
deprive innocent persons of their property. 37 But a property owner's
lack of specific or general intent does not bar a forfeiture. Nor would
it matter that the contraband was not actually within the possession
or control of the owner.' 38 In Thill v. United States,'39 for example,
the owner did not know that his passenger was carrying narcotics
on his person, but the vehicle clearly was facilitating the transporta-
tion of the contraband and thus was forfeited.
Two of the earliest and most cited decisions interpreting the sta-
tutory term "facilitate" are a 1942 case, United States v. One Dodge
134. 49 U.S.C. §§ 781-782 (1970).
135. See United States v. Tito Campanella Societa Di Navigazone, 217 F.2d 751, 756 (4th
Cir. 1954); Manufacturers Acceptance Corp. v. United States, 193 F.2d 622, 624 (6th Cir.
1951); General Ice Cream Corp. v. Benson, 113 F. Supp. 107, 109 (N.D.N.Y. 1953), affl'd, 217
F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1954).
State decisions are in accord. See, e.g., De Feo v. Smith, 17 N.J. 183, _ 110 A.2d 553,
555 (1955); Hargrove v. Lucas, 56 N.M. 323, -, 243 P.2d 623, 626 (1952); Bolding v.
Clanton, 285 P.2d 213, 218 (Okla. 1955); Schlegel v. Hough, 182 Or. 441, -, 186 P.2d 516,
519 (1947); Morgan v. Sorenson, 3 Utah 2d 428, -, 286 P.2d 229, 231 (1955).
136. See United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 252 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1958); United
States v. Graham, 199 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1952); Platt v. United States, 163 F.2d 165 (10th
Cir. 1947); United States v. One 1947 Oldsmobile Sedan, 104 F. Supp. 159 (D.N.J. 1952).
137. "Statutes which undertake to confiscate the property belonging to an innocent third
party must of necessity be construed strictly, yet fairly and reasonably, all to the end that
one be deprived of his property except by the law of the land." United States v. One 1949
Ford Sedan, 96 F. Supp. 341, 343 (W.D.N.C. 1951).
138. See United States v. One 1967 Dodge Pickup Truck, 310 F. Supp. 773, 774-75 (S.D.
Ala. 1970) (innocence of claimant-bank with security interest in automobile no defense to
forfeiture).
139. 66 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1933).
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Coupe,"' and Platt v. United States, decided five years later.' In
One Dodge Coupe the defendant drove his car to a rendevous with
a drug dealer, parked, and entered the dealer's vehicle to purchase
heroin. In a subsequent forfeiture action against the defendant's car,
the District Court for the Southern District of New York held that
the vehicle had facilitated the sale by "lessening the labor" neces-
sary to bring the heroin to the defendant.12 In any event, the court
noted, these facts at least demonstrated probable cause, thus shift-
ing the burden of proof to the claimant.4 3
In 1947, in Platt, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit de-
parted dramatically from the reasoning developed in One Dodge
Coupe to arrive at a narrower interpretation of "facilitate." A girl
borrowed her mother's car to drive to a pharmacy where with a
bogus prescription she obtained morphine; she was arrested leaving
the drugstore. Although the mother knew of her daughter's addic-
tion, the court disallowed the forfeiture:
The use of the automobile did not make the accomplishment of
the purchase more easy [sic] or free it from obstructions or
hindrance, or make the sale any less difficult. It was merely the
means of locomotion by which . . . [the accused] went to the
store to make the purchase. Its use enabled her to get to the store
more quickly than if she had walked or had used a slower means
of transportation. But the argument that this facilitated the pur-
chase disregards the ordinary and accepted meaning of the word
when applied to the sale.'44
Thus, the Tenth Circuit employed the "ordinary and accepted"
meaning of "facilitate" to require more than merely transporting a
criminal offender to the scene of the alleged crime."' One Dodge
Coupe, in contrast, implied that if the vehicle was used merely to
assist the offender in consummating his crime, then seizure and
forfeiture are justified.
140. 43 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
141. 163 F.2d 165 (10th Cir. 1947).
142. 43 F. Supp. at 62.
143. Id. A probable cause showing of "facilitate" can arise by "mere inference" in the
context of the transportation of contraband. See generally United States v. One 1950 Buick
Sedan, 231 F.2d 219 (3d Cir. 1955) (automobile used to facilitate transportation of heroin).
144. 163 F.2d at 167.
145. The Tenth Circuit reaffirmed its narrow construction in United States v. Lane Motor
Co., 199 F.2d 495, 497 (10th Cir. 1952), aff'd per curiam, 344 U.S. 630 (1953) (mere use of
the vehicle to commute to or from the scene of the crime not "facilitating").
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This conflict between the broad construction of "facilitate" in
One Dodge Coupe and the narrower definition in Platt has led to
contradictory results in subsequent cases. One court, for example,
has upheld forfeiture when the vehicle was merely the locus of pay-
ment for illegal drugs.'46 On similar facts, another court earlier had
disallowed forfeiture.'4 7 Likewise, despite a previous dismissal by a
different court of a forfeiture action brought against an automobile
used to drive to an airport a person who then flew to Mexico to
purchase heroin,' a federal court in Texas upheld the forfeiture of
an automobile used solely to transport money for the rental of an
airplane, which then was to be used in smuggling marijuana.,
Nor have the Courts of Appeals favored one interpretation. The
Seventh Circuit has adopted a broad interpretation of "facilitate"
analogous to that enunciated in One Dodge Coupe;'5 the Ninth
Circuit hqs followed Platt. '"I In the most recent case concerning the
construction of "facilitate", United States v. One 1971 Chevrolet
Corvette,5 ' the Fifth Circuit analyzed both interpretations and, in
a well-reasoned decision, offered some guidance for future cases.
The accused had switched cars several times while under the sur-
veillance of narcotics officers. The United States filed a forfeiture
action against the accused's Corvette, which she had been driving
during the day but not when the narcotics were purchased. The
arresting officer testified that the accused had told him that she had
switched vehicles because she did not want to risk seizure of the
146. United States v. One 1951 Oldsmobile Sedan Model 98, 126 F. Supp. 515, 516 (D.
Conn. 1954).
147. United States v. One 1973 Volvo, 337 F. Supp. 810 (W.D. Tex. 1974).
148. United States v. One 1949 Ford Sedan, 96 F. Supp. 341, 344 (W.D.N.C. 1951). The
forfeiture, however, was disallowed in part because the court determined that a bona fide
purchaser without knowledge of the illegal transaction bought the car prior to seizure.
149. United States v. One 1970 Buick Riviera, 374 F. Supp. 277 (D. Minn. 1973).
150. See, e.g., United States v. One 1957 Lincoln Premier, 265 F.2d 734, 736 (7th Cir. 1959)
(defendant arrested for possession of narcotics after leaving certain place in automobile);
United States v. One 1949 Pontiac Sedan, 194 F.2d 756, 761 (7th Cir. 1952) (narcotic pur-
chaser's car, parked outside the house where the purchase was made, presumed driven there
by purchaser).
151. See, e.g., Howard v. United States, 423 F.2d 1102, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 1970) (use of the
car was merely a means of locomotion to reach site where marijuana stored); United States
v. One 1952 Ford Victoria, 114 F. Supp. 458, 460 (N.D. Cal. 1953) (automobile driven to pick-
up site). But see United States v. One 1970 Pontiac GTO, 2-Door Hardtop, 529 F.2d 65, 65-
66 (9th Cir. 1976) (automobile used to facilitate sale of contraband when transaction took
place inside car).
152. 496 F.2d 210 (5th Cir. 1974).
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Corvette. Although the court noted that had the vehicle been used
to avoid surveillance the "facilitate" requirement would have been
satisfied, 5 3 it disallowed the forfeiture because the Corvette "did
not become involved in the criminal act by virtue of the decision not
to use it.' ' 5 Thus the Fifth Circuit joined the Ninth and Tenth
Circuits in holding that property is used to "facilitate" an illegal act
or transportation of contraband if it is directly involved in the illegal
act. Meanwhile, the Seventh Circuit and, apparently, the Second
Circuit 55 require only that the property aid in the commission of the
illegal act. These two courts and those district courts that construe
"facilitate" broadly also rely on the government's easier standard
of probable cause to uphold forfeitures.
Statutory Defenses
As previously noted, once the government establishes that proba-
ble cause existed for the seizure of property, the burden shifts to the
claimant-owner to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, any
available defense. Generally, because forfeitures operate only
against property used in violation of another law, the claimant-
owner, of course, may prove that the law was not violated in the first
instance.' Also, assuming that the issue concerns the transporta-
153. Id. at 212.
154. Id. (emphasis in original).
155. In United States v. One 1974 Cadillac Eldorado Sedan, 548 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1977),
the Second Circuit considered the meaning of "facilitate" under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (4) (1970).
The court held that commuting to the scene of a sale or a meeting where a sale was proposed
was sufficient to uphold a forfeiture, distinguishing the Platt line of cases and relying on 49
U.S.C. § 781 (1970). 548 F.2d at 425. Section 881 added the language "used in any manner
to facilitate," and the court maintained that this broader language encompassed commuting
to the scene. 548 F.2d at 423-24.
156. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. §§ 781, 782 (1970).
That the quantity of contraband transported was relatively small has not been a successful
defense to forfeiture. See, e.g., United States v. One 1957 Oldsmobile, 256 F.2d 931, 933 (5th
Cir. 1958) (small quantity of marijuana in car); Associates Inv. Co. v. United States, 220 F.2d
885, 887-88 (5th Cir. 1955) (two marijuana cigarettes); United States v. One 1952 Model Ford
Sedan, 213 F.2d 252-54 (5th Cir. 1954) (355 grams of marijuana); United States v. One 1971
Porsche, 364 F. Supp. 745, 749 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (two glassine packets of heroin); United States
v. One 1963 Cadillac Hardtop, 231 F. Supp. 27, 29 (E.D. Wis. 1964) (one marijuana cigarette).
In Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974), the Supreme Court
affirmed the forfeiture of a $20,000 yacht on which one marijuana cigarette had been found.
In Suhomlin v. United States, 345 F. Supp. 650 (D. Md. 1972), the court held that the
forfeiture should be imposed only upon those who are significantly involved in criminal
activity. Id. at 654-55. The court based its opinion on United States v. United States Coin &
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tion of contraband, section 782 of title 49 provides two other defen-
ses: the "common carrier"' 57 and "unlawful possession"'' 5 defen-
ses. 59 A discussion of the "common carrier" defense is included later
in the analysis of constitutional issues." In this section, the scope
of the "unlawful possession" defense, which is crucial to the rights
of innocent parties, is considered.
The "unlawful possession" defense derives from section 782 which
states that:
No vessel, vehicle or aircraft shall be forfeited under the provi-
sions of this chapter by reason of any act or omission . . com-
mitted or omitted by any person other than [the] owner while
such vessel, vehicle, or aircraft was unlawfully in the possession
of a person who acquired possession thereof in violation of the
criminal laws of the United States, or of any State.Y16
To prevail on this defense the claimant-owner must prove that the
accused's possession of the property was unlawful. Generally, this
requires a determination that some state law regarding the posses-
Currency, 401 U.S. 715 (1971). Coin & Currency held that "[w]hen the forfeiture statutes
are viewed in their entirety, it is manifest that they are intended to impose a penalty only
upon those who are significantly involved in a criminal enterprise." Id. at 721-22. In Suhom[in
the court observed that the amount of money and property sought to be forfeited was many
times the penalty imposed for related crimes. It should be noted, however, that the court
distinguished the case from those involving contraband. See Doherty v. United States,
500 F.2d 540, 546 (Ct. Cl. 1974) (defense that forfeiture violated fifth amendment because
disproportionate to the offense insufficient when forfeiture is based on marijuana smuggling).
Some state courts have read Coin & Currency as saying that the government must prove
"significant involvement in a criminal enterprise" when the forfeiture law is applied only to
vehicles used in connection with the sale of narcotics. See, e.g., In re the Forfeiture of One
1972 Dodge Challenger, Civil No. 7917 (Sierra County, N.M., April 5, 1974). See also State
v. One Porsche 2-Door, 526 P.2d 917, 919 (Utah 1974) (small quantity of marijuana pleaded
as successful defense) (decided after Calero-Toledo but refusing to follow it). But see State
v. One 1967 Ford Mustang, 266 Md. 275, 276-78, 292 A.2d 64, 66 (1972) (mere possession of
marijuana comes within statute requiring forfeiture and therefore the judiciary has no discre-
tion to deny forfeiture).
157. 49 U.S.C. § 782 (1970) provides in pertinent part:
[N]o vessel, vehicle, or aircraft used by any person as a common carrier in the
transaction of business as such common carrier shall be forfeited. . . unless it
shall appear that. . . the owner. . . or other person in charge of such vehicle
or aircraft was at the time of the alleged illegal act a consenting party or privy
thereto . . ..
To the same effect is 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1970) regarding illegal gambling activities.
158. 49 U.S.C. § 782 (1970).
159. The same defenses are provided in the Drug Abuse Act, 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) (1970).
160. See notes 224-27 infra accompanying text.
161. 49 U.S.C. § 782 (1970).
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sion of property has been violated.' 2 Thus, no question arises if the
person in possession of the vehicle is convicted in state court of theft
or similar criminal acquisition. In many cases, however, federal
courts, in the absence of a state prosecution, must interpret and
apply state law to the circumstances of the accused's possession of
the vessel, vehicle or aircraft.
Meeting the "unlawful possession" defense is always difficult,
especially for claimant-owners who cannot demonstrate that the
accused did not have general permission to use the forfeited prop-
erty. In United States v. Bride,'5 for example, a husband used his
wife's car without her knowledge in illegal bookmaking activities.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals allowed forfeiture of the vehicle
because the husband did not violate any law by taking his wife's
car.' 4 Unfortunately for this and other innocent claimant-owners
the statutory defense requires that the acquisition and possession of
the seized property be unlawful. Thus, if the borrower disobeyed the
owner's orders to return the vehicle immediately or to not lend it to
anyone else, then the property still is subject to forfeiture because
the owner could not prove that the original acquisition was accom-
plished unlawfully.'65 The result would be different, however, if the
user of the vehicle, even though closely related to the innocent
claimant-owner, had no permission to use the vehicle.' 6
The strict standard has been applied in other contexts. Condi-
tional sales contracts that prohibit purchasers from using the vehi-
cles for unlawful purposes have not helped innocent lienholders
avoid forfeitures.' 7 The court, however, may construe state statutes
162. This is true primarily because there are few, if any, federal statutes making possession
of a vehicle illegal. Most car theft statutes are state laws.
163. 308 F.2d 470 (9th Cir. 1962).
164. Id. at 473-74.
165. United States v. One 1951 Oldsmobile Sedan, 135 F. Supp. 873 (E.D. Pa. 1955). Cf.
United States v. One 1973 Pace Arrow M300 Motor Home, 379 F. Supp. 223 (N.D. Cal. 1974)
(innocent mobile home owner had given defendant blanket permission to use home); United
States v. One 1963 Cadillac Hardtop, 231 F. Supp. 27, 30-31 (E.D. Wis. 1964) (owner's
daughter gave third person permission to drive automobile contrary to owner's instructions).
166. United States v. One 1971 Ford Truck, 346 F. Supp. 613, 620-21 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
167. See, e.g., United States v. One 1967 Cadillac Coupe Eldorado, 415 F.2d 647, 648 (9th
Cir. 1969). A similar clause also might be found in a security agreement or chattel mortgage.
That a lienholder may intervene in a forfeiture action has rarely been seriously contested
because 19 U.S.C. § § 1615 and 1618 have been interpreted as providing the right to intervene
in judicial forfeiture proceedings to any person having a "legally recognized interest." See




broadly to find a violation so that seized property may be returned
to a clearly innocent claimant-owner. In one case, the person in
possession of a vehicle had purchased it and arranged for credit
using a false name. ' The court found that the purchaser's use of a
false name violated a state statute prohibiting the making of a false
statement to obtain credit, even though no data on the form other
than the name was false. "9 A claimant-owner also may benefit from
the liberal construction given "joy-riding" statutes,1 70 which gener-
ally impose criminal penalties for taking a vehicle without the con-
sent or knowledge of the owner. Thus, when the claimant-owner has
loaned his car on previous occasions to the party charged with pos-
session, but not on the occasion of the unlawful activity, some courts
have found a violation of the "joy-riding" statute and disallowed
forfeiture.7
To summarize, the claimant must prove the "unlawful posses-
sion" defense by a preponderance of the evidence. This can only be
accomplished by convincing the court that both the acquisition and
possession of the vehicle were in violation of state law. The constitu-
tional issues raised by this requirement are considered below. 7 2
"Record or Reputation"
In addition to defending on any of the three grounds noted above,
an innocent lessor or lienholder without knowledge of the possessor's
illegal activity may seek remission or mitigation of the forfeiture by
a third means. Section 3617(b) of title 18 allows remission or mitiga-
tion if before accepting a vehicle as security for a loan the claimant,
as a prospective lender, made a "reasonable" investigation of the
borrower's "reputation and record" as a liquor law violator. 73 Sur-
prisingly, the burden is on the government to prove by a preponder-
168. United States v. 1957 Oldsmobile 4-Door Sedan, 173 F. Supp. 956 (S.D. Tex. 1959).
169. Id. at 957.
170. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 499b (West 1970 & Supp. 1978), which provides in
pertinent part:
Any person who shall, without the permission of the owner thereof, take any
. vehicle . . . for the purpose of temporarily using or operating the same,
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor ....
171. United States v. One Ford Mustang 1971 Mach I, 354 F. Supp. 81,85 (C.D. Cal. 1973);
accord, United States v. Commercial Credit Corp., 228 F.2d 215, 216 (5th Cir. 1955) (denying
forfeiture when automobile was unlawfully taken and used without the owner's consent).
172. See notes 211-20 infra & accompanying text.
173. 18 U.S.C. § 3617(b) (1970).
1978]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:661
ance of the evidence that the borrower-mortgagor had such a re-
cord,' a requirement that has been determinative in several
cases.'75 But even if the government is unable to establish such a
record, the claimant's failure to investigate, alone, will not defeat
his right to remission.' 5
In deciding what constitutes a "reasonable" investigation, a ma-
jority of courts require a lienholder to have made inquiry at least of
the local and state law enforcement community.' Records can be
checked quite easily by any local law enforcement agency through
the National Crime Information Center computer service. Informa-
tion pertinent to an individual's reputation also can be obtained by
the prospective mortgagee at the local sheriff or police office. But
the claimant must be sure to check all sources of information, in-
cluding local residents who might know the individual's reputation,
for on several occasions the innocent claimant has suffered when the
court's hindsight has proven sharper than his foresight. In United
States v. Carey,11 after an investigation made by the lienholder-
claimant revealed no past infractions, the government offered proof
that the accused did have a local reputation for transporting illegal
174. United States v. One 1969 Chevrolet Pickup Truck, 321 F. Supp. 916, 919 (W.D. Tenn.
1971).
175. See, e.g., United States v. One 1972 Ford Pickup Truck, 374 F. Supp. 413, 415 (E.D.
Tenn. 1973). The stringency of the burden placed on the government has been the difference
between the claimant regaining his vehicle and forfeiting it in several cases. In Ford Pickup
Truck the claimant-lienholder had not inquired about the reputation or record of the pur-
chaser. The court noted, however, that no record or reputation would have been found had
the inquiry been made. Therefore, because the government could not sustain its burden by
demonstrating that the purchaser did in fact have such a record or reputation, the claimant
prevailed. But see United States v. One 1968 International Havester Farmall-Tractor, 452
F.2d 110 (4th Cir. 1971) (forfeiture allowed because an inquiry would have revealed mortga-
gor's reputation for dealing in liquor for which the appropriate taxes had not been paid).
176. See, e.g., United States v. One 1972 Ford Pickup Truck, 374 F. Supp. 413, 415 (E.D.
Tenn. 1973); United States v. One 1969 Chevrolet Pickup Truck, 321 F. Supp. 916, 919 (W.D.
Tenn. 1971). But see People v. 1940 Ford V-8 Coupe, 36 Cal. 2d 471, -, 224 P.2d 677, 681
(1950) (forfeiture allowed notwithstanding that a reasonable investigation would have re-
vealed no record or reputation).
177. 18 U.S.C. § 3617(b) (1970) provides that remission should be allowed if, on inquiry of
the "sheriff, chief of police, principal Federal internal-revenue officer engaged in the enforce-
ment of liquor laws, or other principal local or Federal law enforcement officer .... ," the
lender was informed that the borrower had no such record or reputation. See United States
v. One 1969 Chevrolet Pickup Truck, 321 F. Supp. 916, 920 (W.D. Tenn. 1971) (interpretation
that inquiry of only one of the specified officers is required under the statute is a reasonable
requirement).
178. 272 F.2d 492 (5th Cir. 1959).
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whiskey. In allowing the forfeiture, the court opined that a more
extensive inquiry would have uncovered these facts.7 1 In City Na-
tional Bank v. United States,'80 the lending institution had discov-
ered that the borrower had a record, but the violations had occured
much earlier in his life and since that time he had not been charged
with any other crimes. In fact, the local sheriff had indicated to the
bank that the borrower was now a good risk. The court held, how-
ever, that any record was sufficient to put a claimant on notice, and
the car was forfeited. The claimant argued that this decision would
cause a bad record to haunt a borrower for the rest of his life. Not
at all, replied the court: "The statute merely requires those taking
liens from liquor law violators to assume the risk if they revert to
their former unlawful activity."''
Thus, as these decisions clearly indicate, a "reasonable" investi-
gation would be better characterized as an "extensive" investiga-
tion. To secure his property interests, an innocent claimant must
have conducted a thorough search of the individual's background
and community standing; any evidence of the proscribed reputation
or record, whatever its source, may prove fatal.
FORFEITURE AND THE CONSTITUTION
Procedural Due Process
The constitutional requirement of procedural due process imposes
upon the government or other seizing authority the obligation to
give proper notice and an adequate opportunity to be heard before
the property is forfeited summarily.' But beyond these minimal
requirements there also may be other implications of procedural due
process.
Notice
The timeliness of notice to the party whose property is seized has
been the subject of several recent Supreme Court decisions. In
179. Id.
180. 207 F.2d 741 (10th Cir. 1953).
181. Id. at 744. See also People v. One 1941 Ford 8 Stake Truck, 26 Cal. 2d 503, -, 159
P.2d 641, 643 (1945): "The public interest to be protected against the drug and its victims
outweighs the loss suffered by those whose confidence in others proves to be misplaced. .. ."
182. See generally Note, Due Process in Automobile Forfeiture Proceedings, 3 BALI. L.
REv. 270 (1974).
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Fuentes v. Shevin, 13 the Court held that a replevin action, the sei-
zure of private property by another private person claiming a better
right to possession, could not be brought ex parte without reasona-
ble notice and an opportunity for a hearing. Such ex parte seizures
might be constitutionally permissible, the Court noted, only if there
is some special need for very prompt action. The application of
Fuentes to forfeiture cases was considered in Calero-Toledo v. Pear-
son Yacht Leasing Co. 84 In Calero-Toledo the claimant-lessor
argued that the seizure of a vessel without meeting the notice and
opportunity for a hearing requirements of Fuentes deprived the les-
sor of property without the due process of law guaranteed by the
fourteenth amendment. The Court rejected this argument, holding
that there was "no constitutional necessity under Fuentes or any
other case in this Court to accord the owner-lessor of the yacht a
hearing in the circumstances of this case."' In the Court's view, the
forfeiture statute served important governmental purposes and
thus presented an 'extraordinary' situation in which postponement
of notice and hearing until after seizure did not deny due process.","'
Seizure permits Puerto Rico to assert in rem jurisdiction over the
property in order to conduct forfeiture proceedings, thereby fos-
tering the public interest in preventing continued illicit use of the
property and in enforcing criminal sanctions. Second, preseizure
notice and hearing might frustrate the interests served by the
statutes, since the property seized - as here, a yacht - will often
be of a sort that could be removed to another jurisdiction, de-
stroyed or concealed, if advance warning of confiscation were
given. And finally, unlike the situation in Fuentes, seizure is not
initiated by self-interested private parties; rather, Common-
wealth officials determine whether seizure is appropriate under
the provisions of the Puerto Rican statutes. "7
Because of the similarity between the Puerto Rican statute and the
corresponding United States Code provision,"' it is likely that the
183. 407 U.S. 67 (1972). See generally Note, The Growth of Procedural Due Process into a
New Substance, 66 Nw. U. L. Rav. 502 (1971).
184. 416 U.S. 663 (1974). The same issue also arose prior to the Calero-Toledo decision in
United States v. One 1967 Porsche, Model 911-Targa, 492 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1974), with the
same results.
185. 416 U.S. at 691 (White, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
186. Id. at 680 (footnote omitted).
187. Id. at 679 (footnote omitted).
188. 49 U.S.C. §§ 781-789 (1970).
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Calero-Toledo decision will be followed in federal forfeiture proceed-
ings.
Even though Calero-Toledo held that a forfeiture may be valid
without pre-seizure notice, if the statute itself calls for notice, then
due process dictates that the notice be calculated reasonably to
inform all interested parties of the impending legal action."9 Thus,
in Jaekal v. United States, 9 the plaintiff brought an action against
the United States under the Tucker Act,191 which allows suits for the
recovery of damages under $10,000 if the money sued for was
"improperly paid, exacted, or taken from the claimant in contraven-
tion of the Constitution, a statute or regulation." '92 In Jaekal the
District Court for the Southern District of New York determined
that, when the government knew the car owner's name and address,
notice by publication, as required by statute,9 3 was not sufficient
to meet the requirements of due process. Three years later, in
Menkarell v. Bureau of Narcotics,"I the. Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit approved JaekaL. Again notice was published, though
not delivered to the owner, whose name and address were known to
the seizing authority. The court, although not holding that the in-
stant notice statute'95 was unconstitutional, certainly cast doubt on
its vitality. It observed that the provision requires only that notice
be published in a newspaper, that the owner's name need not be
included in the notice, that the notice include publication of the
motor number, not the more familiar registration number, and, fi-
nally, that the notice could be published in any newspaper in the
judicial district, conceivably even in a publication of minimal circu-
lation. Under these circumstances the court found it "quite evident
that the summary forfeiture procedure has not been designed to
maximize the opportunities for notice and opportunity to be heard
"196 The Bureau of Narcotics actually had communicated
189. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
190. 304 F. Supp. 993 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
191. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1970). See text accompanying notes 97-99 supra. This Act has
provided the means of challenging a number of forfeitures on constitutional grounds. See, e.g.,
Simmons v. United States, 497 F.2d 1046 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. One 1965 Chevrolet
Impala Convertible, 475 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. One 1961 Red Chevrolet
Impala Sedan, 457 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir. 1972).
192. Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United States, 372 F.2d 1002, 1007 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
193. 49 U.S.C. § 782 (1970); 19 U.S.C. § 1607 (1970); 21 C.F.R. § 1316.75 (1977).
194. 463 F.2d 88 (3d Cir. 1972).
195. 19 U.S.C. § 1607 (1970).
196. 463 F.2d at 94.
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with the owner but had not given notice of the forfeliture except
through publication. Therefore, the court held that the due process
requirement had not been met: "Due process may not demand ac-
tual notice in every case, but it forbids the use of a method of notice
which is not reasonably calculated to reach those who could easily
be informed by other means readily at hand. ' '1 7
Similarly, the Supreme Court has insisted steadfastly on proper
notice procedures.' In Robinson v. Hanrahan, "I the only forfeiture
case to reach the Supreme Court on the notice issue, the accused
had been arrested on charges of armed robbery and was in jail when
forfeiture proceedings were instituted. Notice was mailed to his
home, and when no answer was received the automobile was for-
feited summarily. The Court ordered the car returned because the
notice was not reasonably calculated to apprise the owner of the
proceedings.10
Delay
Undue delay by the government in commencing forfeiture pro-
ceedings also may violate procedural due process requirements.
Early cases held that if the action was brought within the five year
limitation period provided for in the statute, there was no due pro-
cess violation.01 In 1971, however, the Supreme Court, in United
States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs,2 ' held that long delays in initi-
ating forfeiture proceedings were intolerable under the due process
mandate of the fifth amendment. In that case, to save the pornogra-
phy importation statute 3 from constitutional attack, the Court
construed the statute to require the institution of judicial proceed-
ings no later than fourteen days after the date of seizure and a
decision no later than sixty days after the date of filing of the ac-
tion.2 4 Although Thirty-Seven Photographs might be distinguished
197. Id.
198. See, e.g., Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962); Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
199. 409 U.S. 38 (1972) (per curiam).
200. Id. at 40.
201. United States v. One 1950 Buick Sedan, 231 F.2d 219 (3d Cir. 1955). But see United
States v. Fields, 425 F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1970).
202. 402 U.S. 363 (1971).
203. 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (1970).
204. 402 U.S. at 373-74. Thirty-Seven Photographs was followed in United States v. 77
Cartons of Magazines, 444 F.2d 81 (9th Cir. 1971).
[Vol. 19:661
MODERN FORFEITURE LAW
from other forfeiture actions on the ground that the pornography
importation statute imposed no specific time limits, its clear hold-
ing that unreasonable delays will not be tolerated should have con-
siderable impact in all forfeiture actions.
To some extent this prediction has been born out in later cases.
For example, in United States v. One 1971 Opel GT,05 the claim-
ant's son allegedly had used marijuana in the subject vehicle. The
automobile was seized on April 16, 1972, and the requisite bond
was filed by the claimant on October 30, 1972. The government
lodged its forfeiture complaint on May 31, 1973, more than a year
after the seizure. In disallowing the forfeiture, the District Court
for the Central District of California determined that such a delay,
when dealing with a wasting asset, was a violation of the claimant's
constitutionally protected rights:
If the claimant is so delayed in the exercise of the remedies af-
forded him that the property becomes substantially worthless
before there can be a judicial determination, or is very greatly
diminished in value even though it retains some worth, new di-
mensions are put on the summary forfeiture procedures making
the matter one of constitutional significance.""
The same court that decided 1971 Opel held a year later, in
United States v. A Quantity of Gold Jewelry,207 that undue delay in
a forfeiture action constitutes a denial of due process rights. More-
over, that the claimant sought administrative relief does not justify
governmental delay in the institution of proceedings. Finally, the
court disposed of the government's argument that the action need
only be brought within the five-year limitation period, holding that
a statute of limitations could not be used to abridge due process
guarantees.2 18
Thirty-Seven Photographs, 1971 Opel, and Gold Jewelry clearly
indicate that dispatch is required in instituting forfeiture proceed-
ings. Strict time limits have not been determined judicially, but
under the most widely used forfeiture statute209 a delay of nine
months following the completion of the government's investigation
205. 360 F. Supp. 638 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
206. Id. at 641.
207. 379 F. Supp. 283 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
208. Id. at 287-88.
209. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1624 (1970) (violation of customs laws).
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is too long.210 In the future the government will be required to comm-
ence proceedings virtually immediately after seizure or at least
without unreasonable delay. Any delay not occasioned by the claim-
ant may become constitutionally suspect and invite detailed judi-
cial examination.
Reasonable Doubt - The Burden of Proof Challenge
As discussed in detail above, 21' under most forfeiture statutes the
government is required only to show probable cause that the vehicle
or other property was used in violation of the statute, shifting to the
claimant the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence
any defense. A few statutes require the government to show a statu-
tory offense by a preponderance of the evidence, but because forfei-
ture proceedings possess at least some attributes of a criminal ac-
tion, conceivably, the stricter reasonable doubt standard could be
imposed.
Efforts by claimants to have this heavier burden placed on the
government, however, have met with stiff resistance from the
courts. In Bramble v. Richardson,2 2 the claimant argued that the
Supreme Court in United States v. United States Coin and
Currency213 had indicated that forfeiture actions were penal in na-
ture, the forfeiture producing the same result upon the guilty party
as a fine. 2'4 Moreover, in In re Winship,21 5 the Supreme Court deter-
mined that at the very least the standard of proof reflected a pro-
found common law tradition concerning the way the law should be
administered, although it left undecided whether the reasonable
doubt standard is a requirement of due process attaching to all
proceedings of even remotely a criminal nature. Thus, the claimant
argued, to allow forfeiture without use of the "reasonable doubt"
standard may violate due process and surely would contravene the
dictum in Winship. Rejecting these arguments, the court in
Bramble held that, because a forfeiture proceeding is a hybrid ac-
210. Sarkisian v. United States, 472 F.2d 468 (10th Cir. 1973). But see United States v.
One 1972 Wood, 19 ft. Custom Boat, 501 F.2d 1327 (5th Cir. 1974) (one year delay).
211. See text accompanying notes 100-33 supra.
212. 498 F.2d 968 (10th Cir. 1974). See also Lee v. Thornton, 398 F. Supp. 970 (D. Vt. 1975).
213. 401 U.S. 715 (1971).
214. The forfeiture acts manifest a clear intention "to impose a penalty only upon those
who [werel significantly involved in a criminal enterprise." 401 U.S. at 721-22.
215. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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tion exhiibiting characteristics common to both civil and criminal
actions, no violation of due process results from the use of the civil
burden of proof. 26
Bramble, however, may conflict in principle with Fell v.
Armour,2 7 in which the Tennessee forfeiture act was challenged on
the ground that the burden was placed not upon the state but upon
the owner seeking recovery of his vehicle. The court first stated that
the forfeiture act was punitive in nature and that "one who is to
suffer a penalty for a crime is entitled to greater procedural safe-
guards than one who is merely a party to a civil suit. '218 Therefore,
before denying the claimant's petition for recovery, the court rea-
soned, the state must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
the vehicle was used in violation of the act: "The Act by placing no
burden upon the State to prove that the seized conveyance was used
in violation of the Act deprives owners of seized conveyances their
rights to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment." 219 But
because in Fell the court presumed that forfeiture is penal in nature,
this decision may be distinguished in federal cases upon the ration-
ale of Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 220 which re-
stricted the penal orientation of the Coin and Currency definition
of forfeitures.
Equal Protection
The fourteenth amendment forbids "any State [to] deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law...
" or to "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
216. 498 F.2d at 972-73. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972), in which the Supreme Court
held that the voluntariness of a confession must be proved by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, provides some support for the decision in Bramble. The holding in Lego may be
somewhat narrower, however, since the basis for the motion to exclude the confession was
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), which held unconstitutional a New York procedure
whereby the jury first considered the voluntariness of the confession, then considered its
weight in determining guilt. This procedure, said the Court, deprived the accused of his
"constitutional right. . . to object to the use of the confession and to have a fair hearing and
a reliable determination on the issue of voluntariness ...... Id. at 376-77.
217. 355 F. Supp. 1319 (M.D. Tenn. 1972).
218. Id. at 1331.
219. rd. at 1335. The court rejected the notion that the state must prove its case beyond a
reasonable doubt. Many state forfeiture statutes do not specify a burden of proof and thus
may be unconstitutional according to Fell. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 54-11-33 (1953
Comp.).
220. 416 U.S. 663 (1974); see notes 26-38 supra & accompanying text.
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tion of the laws."' 221 This protection is afforded citizens of the United
States by virtue of the due process clause of the fifth amendment. 22
As discussed earlier, 2 3 the most commonly used federal forfeiture
act, sections 781 and 782 of title 49, allows for two affirmative defen-
ses: (1) that the vehicle was taken from the owner and was in the
possession of the violator in contravention of some state law, or (2)
that the vehicle was the property of a common carrier at the time
of the violation.
The "common carrier" defense is predicated upon the premise
that, although a lienholder or lessor may have the opportunity to
investigate his client, to force a common carrier to investigate ship-
pers or passengers would be extremely impractical and unreasona-
bly burdensome. 224 In at least one case 22- the claimant-lienholder
argued that to allow an exemption for common carriers but not for
lienholders violates the right to equal protection guaranteed by the
due process clause of the fifth amendment, thereby rendering the
statute unconstitutional. 21 Summarily disposing of this argument
in upholding the statute, the court determined that the exempted
class was reasonable in light of the limited opportunity of the com-
mon carrier to detect or prevent carriage of contraband by one of
its passengers.2 2
Perhaps the most cogent equal protection argument was ad-
vanced in Doherty v. United States.2 2 The claimant-owner was not
221. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
222. See Goodpaster, The Integration of Equal Protection, Due Process Standards and the
Indigent's Right of Free Access to the Courts, 56 IOWA L. Rv. 223 (1970).
223. See text accompanying notes 157-59 supra.
224. Compare the common carrier's right to search passengers for weapons prior to board-
ing in light of the wave of hijackings in the 1960's. See generally 26 U. FLA. L. REv. 329 (1974).
225. United States v. One 1962 Ford Thunderbird, 232 F. Supp. 1019 (N.D. Ill. 1964). See
also United States v. One 1971 Mercedes-Benz 2 Door, 542 F.2d 912 (4th Cir. 1976); United
States v. One 1957 Oldsmobile, 256 F.2d 931 (5th Cir. 1958).
226. 49 U.S.C. § 782 (1970) was the statute in question.
227. 232 F. Supp. at 1023. See also United States v. One 1957 Oldsmobile, 256 F.2d 931,
933 (5th Cir. 1958).
The equal protection clause does not deny "the power to treat different classes of persons
in different ways . . . . [Iti does, however, deny . . . the power to legislate that different
treatment be accorded to persons placed by a statute into different classes on the basis of
criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that statute. A classification 'must be reasonable,
not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial
relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be
treated alike."' Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971) (quoting Royster Guano Co. v.
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
228. 500 F.2d 540 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
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an innocent lessor nor a lienholder but instead was one of the parties
arrested and convicted for illegally smuggling marijuana. At the
time of the arrest, Doherty had been in the vehicle with another
man who also was convicted for the same offense. Doherty argued
that the Supreme Court, in United States v. United States Coin and
Currency,229 had determined that forfeiture actions were penal in
nature, that the forfeiture amounted to a fine, and, therefore, that
he had suffered a greater penalty than his accomplice who did not
have any interest in the vehicle. 23s Thus, he argued, the law denied
equal protection to those who were arrested and punished not only
by fine and prison sentence but also by the forfeiture of their prop-
erty.23' The court rejected this argument, stating:
It is not irrational to penalize, through the loss of their invest-
ment, those who capitalize a criminal venture by throwing useful
property into the illegal partnership, while not subjecting to this
risk those who furnish only their personal services. Doherty aided
the criminal arrangement by furnishing both himself and his
truck, while Hansma supplied. only himself. It is not arbitrary to
take account of this significant difference in amount and quality
of participation. There is no violation of equal protection or due
process. -2
In Fell v. Armour,2 3 the plaintiff challenged a Tennessee statu-
tory requirement that a $250 bond be posted before the forfeiture
could be examined by a court, similar to a provision appearing in
229. 401 U.S. 715 (1971).
230. See generally Note, Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons: A Reassessment, 25 STAN. L.
REv. 845 (1973); see also Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
231. The argument was accepted in Suhomlin v. United States, 345 F. Supp. 650 (D. Md.
1972), in which the court relied on Coin and Currency. The decision was before Calero-Toledo,
however, and therefore should be relied upon with caution.
232. 500 F.2d at 546. The court relied extensively on Calero-Toledo in characterizing forfei-
ture as a "hybrid" proceeding, related to the criminal process "because intimately connected
with the enforcement of the criminal law, and because the protections of the Fourth amend-
ment and the Fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination apply to forfeiture pro-
ceedings." Id. at 544. However, the court realized, forfeitures also have a "civil" element, as
characterized by the Supreme Court in Calero-Toledo. Id. at 544-45. The court admitted that,
although some forfeitures are primarily criminal, calling for criminal proceedings, see Con-
necticut Action Now, Inc. v. Roberts Plating Co., 457 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1972) (fine for discharg-
ing waste in violation of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. §§ 407, 411 (1970)),
the statute involved in Doherty, 19 U.S.C. § 1595a (aiding unlawful importation) levies a civil
penalty, "to be enforced, where necessary, by a civil proceeding, and subject (with important
exceptions) to the constitutional oversight for civil matters." 500 F.2d at 545.
233. 355 F. Supp. 1319 (M.D. Tenn. 1972); see text accompanying notes 217-20 supra.
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title 19 relating to forfeiture proceedings by the United States. '4
The plaintiff contended that the bond requirement, by effectively
precluding indigents from access to the hearing procedure, violated
the due process and equal protection provisions of the fourteenth
amendment. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Boddie v.
Connecticut,"' the three-judge court agreed:
The $250 cost bond of the Act allows one sufficiently affluent to
obtain a hearing whereby he may seek recovery of his vehicle and
avoid the harsh penalty of forfeiture. Those owners of seized vehi-
cles who cannot afford the cost bond have their rights to seek
recovery of the vehicle and thereby avoid the harsh penalty of
forfeiture extinguished by their personal poverty. As to these in-
digent owners, the effect of the $250 cost bond requirement is to
grant to the seizing police officer the effective right to extinguish
all property interests. As to those too poor to afford a hearing, this
exercise of raw power can only lead to arbitrary state action in
that no neutral hearing officer or judicial official will have the
opportunity to review the evidence and determine the propriety
of the forfeiture or the claim for recovery. Thus, the indigent
owner may be deprived of property without due process of law in
that the deprivation may occur without any process whatsoever.
As to the indigent owner the Act does not provide the requisite
"'protection of the individual against arbitrary action' which Mr.
Justice Cardozo characterized as the very essence of due pro-
cess."23
Although the constitutionality of a state statute was at issue in
Fell, the same reasoning could be applied to the procedure outlined
in title 19, section 1608 of the United States Code. The issue re-
cently arose in Lee v. Thornton,23 in which the court squarely ad-
dressed whether the $250 cost bond set out in the United States
Code denied indigents equal protection. The court held that it did
not because the bond was reasonably calculated to help defray the
costs associated with hearing claims under $2,500. Although not
discussed, Fell may be distinguished on the ground that the federal
234. 19 U.S.C. § 1608 (1970).
235. 401 U.S. 371 (1971). See also Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966);
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). For a complete discussion of the Boddie decision and
its progeny, see 8 HA.v. C.R.-C.L. L. Rav. 571 (1973).
236. 355 F. Supp. at 1333 (quoting Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 559 (1956)).
237. 398 F. Supp. 1970 (D. Vt. 1975), aff'd, 538 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1976).
[Vol. 19:661
MODERN FORFEITURE LAW
statute, unlike Tennessee's, allows remission. However, because
remission and mitigation are a matter of grace and do not involve
a hearing before a neutral hearing officer or judicial official, this
distinction is not compelling."'
Double Jeopardy and Collateral Estoppel
The fifth amendment provides, in addition to the due process and
just compensation protections, that no citizen of the United States
should "twice be put in jeopardy of life or limb" for the same crimi-
nal offense. The civil counterpart, known as res judicata, has long
been a part of the common law:
The judgment of a court of concurrent jurisdiction, directly upon
the point, is as a plea or bar, or as evidence conclusive, between
the same parties, upon the same matter directly in question in
another court; and the judgment of a court of exclusive jurisdic-
tion, directly upon the point, is, in like manner, conclusive upon
the same matter, between the same parties; coming incidentally
in the question in another court for a different purpose.29
A party may be collaterally estopped from raising in a criminal trial
an issue already litigated in a civil proceeding, and, provided the
same parties are involved, a determination in a civil court may be
binding on the parties to a criminal action. In Ashe v. Swenson,4
the Supreme Court stated the rule as follows:
[Collateral estoppel] means simply that when an issue of ulti-
mate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judg-
ment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same par-
ties in any future lawsuit. Although first developed in civil litiga-
tion, collateral estoppel has been an established rule of federal
criminal law at least since this Court's decision more than 50
years ago in United States v. Oppenheimer .... 24
Underlying this rule is the policy to prevent the relitigation of issues
238. "[TIhe district courts have jurisdiction to award relief from unlawful forfeitures.
While the Secretary has been given sole power to mitigate proper forfeitures, he has not been
given sole power to determine the propriety of forfeitures themselves." Simons v. United
States, 497 F.2d 1046, 1049 (9th Cir. 1974). See also Jaekel v. United States, 304 F. Supp.
993 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
239. R. v. Duchess of Kingston, 20 Howell, St. Tr. 355, 358 (1776).
240. 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
241. Id. at 443 (citation omitted).
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already judicially determined.2 2 Thus, the question that arises in
forfeiture actions is whether an acquittal on a related criminal
charge in a criminal action, a dismissal of the charge, or a pardon
serve as a bar to a subsequent forfeiture action either by reason of
the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy or because
of the bars of res judicata or collateral estoppel.
The application of collateral estoppel to forfeiture actions was
first considered in the early case of Gelston v. Hoyt;2 14 it was not
until 1886 in Coffey v. United States, 244 though, that the doctrine
reached its zenith. In Coffey the accused was acquitted in a jury
trial of the charge of failing to pay taxes on whiskey. The govern-
ment pressed for forfeiture in a separate in rem proceeding. The
Court reviewed the collateral estoppel rule and determined that the
factual basis of the in rem action was identical to that of the
criminal proceeding. Thus, the Court concluded, the forfeiture ac-
tion could not be maintained by the government because the facts
had been found in the defendant's favor in the criminal proceeding:
[W]here an issue raised as to the existence of the act or fact
denounced has been tried in a criminal proceeding, instituted by
the United States, and a judgment of acquittal has been rendered
in favor of a particular person, that judgment is conclusive in
favor of such person, on the subsequent trial of a suit in rem by
the United States, where, as against him, the existence of the
same act or fact is the matter in issue, as a cause for the forfeiture
of the property prosecuted in such suit in rem.24
5
Thus, there appeared to be three prerequisites to the defense of
collateral estoppel by the property owner: (1) the associated crimi-
nal action against him must have been brought by the United
States; (2) he must have been acquitted of these charges; (3) the
issue in the forfeiture proceeding must be the same one previously
litigated in the criminal action. This last requirement is used most
often by courts to distinguish Coffey.211
The erosion of the Coffey doctrine began soon after it appeared,
242. If an issue has been raised in prior litigation, but not resolved, it may be the subject
of a later controversy, and its determination is not barred by the doctrine of collateral es-
toppel. United States v. International Bldg. Co., 345 U.S. 502 (1953).
243. 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 246 (1818).
244. 116 U.S. 436 (1886).
245. Id. at 443.
246. See, e.g., United States v. Zucker, 161 U.S. 475 (1896).
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first in the lower courts,247 and only slightly later in the Supreme
Court. In Stone v. United States, 25 the accused was acquitted of a
charge of illegally cutting timber on government property. The
United States thereafter sued Stone to recover the value of the wood
allegedly cut, against which he pleaded the criminal action as a bar.
The Court disagreed; the purpose of the suit was not punitive, but
merely to reimburse the government for the lost timber. Because the
basis for each action differed, the defense failed. 249
Similarly, the different policies underlying a civil suit and a re-
lated criminal action were relied upon by the Court in the landmark
case of Helvering v. Mitchell.250 After Mitchell had been acquitted
of income tax evasion, the Bureau of Internal Revenue attempted
to collect the fraud penalty on taxes owed. The Court determined
that if the objective of the civil action was remedial, not punitive,
then the civil action would not be barred even if both actions arose
from the same facts. In Mitchell the Court found that the action was
remedial, used primarily to facilitate the recovery of taxes, and that,
therefore, the defense of double jeopardy or collateral estoppel was
inapposite. 2 ' The distinction between punitive and remedial ac-
tions, relied upon by the Court in many subsequent actions, is
often so fine as to defy definition;252 this artificial reasoning has
resulted in confusion among the federal courts.sa
Besides the punitive/remedial distinction, other factors may sup-
port the denial of a claimant's collateral estoppel or double jeopardy
defense. Forfeiture has been regarded as an action against the prop-
247. See, e.g., United States v. Three Copper Stills, 47 F. 495 (D. Ky. 1890).
248. 167 U.S. 178 (1897).
249. To the same effect is Murphy v. United States, 272 U.S. 630 (1926), in which the
accused was acquitted of a nuisance charge. The subsequent action was to abate the nuisance,
a matter of prevention, not a second punishment, said the Court.
250. 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
251. But cf. United States v. LaFranca, 282 U.S. 568 (1930) (tax may be a penalty used to
punish for an infraction of the law); United States v. 86.9 Cases, More or Less, of Assorted
Distilled Spirits, Wine and Beer, 337 F. Supp. 1355 (S.D. Fla. 1971) (refusal to pay tax on
spirits resulting in acquittal, forfeiture barred).
252. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943) (double damages
are remedial, not punitive); Johnson v. Wall, 329 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1964) (suit for taxes
remedial).
253. Compare United States v. Two Hundred Fifty Four United States Twenty Dollar Gold
Coins, 355 F. Supp. 298 (E.D. Mich. 1973) (forfeiture of coins is not a penalty but merely a
reasonable means of reimbursing the government for investigation expenses) with United
States v. One 1956 Ford Fairlane Tudor Sedan, 272 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1959) (car used to
transport illegal liquor not forfeitable since action is punitive, not remedial in any sense).
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erty for its part in the criminal activity, rendering the guilt or inno-
cence of the owner immaterial. 254 Also, many courts have reasoned
that because a forfeiture action is civil in form, an acquittal in the
criminal action simply means that the government failed to meet
its burden of proving the accused guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt,22 and, thus, there is no contradiction inhering in an acquittal
of all criminal charges and a subsequent forfeiture of the accused's
property. For example, in One Lot of Emerald Cut Stones and One
Ring v. United States,151 although the accused had been acquitted
of charges stemming from a smuggling operation into the United
States, the government proceeded with a forfeiture action.27 The
owner claimed that his acquittal in the criminal case precluded the
forfeiture proceeding. The Court disagreed, reasoning that because
the basis for the owner's acquittal in the criminal matter might have
been the government's failure to prove the requisite specific intent,
an essential element only of the criminal offense, the same issues
had not been determined and collateral estoppel would not apply.
Seeking to further justify its decision, the Court reiterated that the
forfeiture action was remedial, not punitive, in that it was intended
to assist in the enforcement of the tariff regulations by keeping
certain merchandise out of the country. Thus, because the forfeiture
was not the result of a criminal offense but rather was a separate
action, the acquittal of the owner was no defense. The decision in
Coffey was mentioned only briefly and distinguished in a passing
footnote.
254. Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926); United States v. Olsen, 57 F. 579 (1893).
See also Various Items of Personal Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 577 (1931): "The
provision of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution in respect of double jeopardy does not
apply." Id. at 581.
The nominal difference in the parties to the respective actions also has been suggested as
a reason for not applying res judicata or collateral estoppel:
Res judicata imports, by definition almost, the same parties. It is not enough
that in some court somewhere the same facts have been decided. These same
facts must be viewed from the point of view of the parties giving them legal
scrutiny. Here the parties are not the same.
United States v. One Dodge Sedan, 113 F.2d 552, 554 (3d Cir. 1940) (footnote omitted).
255. Murphy v. United States, 272 U.S. 630 (1926); United States v. One Assortment of
12 Rifles and 21 Handguns, 313 F. Supp. 641 (M.D. Fla. 1970); United States v. One 1961
Cadillac Hardtop, 207 F. Supp. 693 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).
256. 409 U.S. 232 (1972).




Similarly, in United States v. Alcatex, Inc., . the court relied
upon the remedial/punitive distinction to reject the defendant-
claimant's argument that his conviction in the prior criminal pro-
ceeding barred the civil forfeiture proceeding in that the forfeiture
constituted a second punishment for the same actions resulting in
his earlier conviction. The court distinguished decisions characteriz-
ing forfeiture acts as penal, stating that this label applied only to
the protection of certain personal rights such as due process and
search and seizure. Turning to the challenged statute, the court,
relying on Helvering v. Mitchell,2'1 held that the forfeiture had a
remedial purpose, to reimburse the government for the expenses of
investigation and that, therefore, there was no double jeopardy.
The defense of double jeopardy has been notably unsuccessful
since the Court's decision in Emerald Cut Stones.20 Although the
double jeopardy clause prohibits two criminal sanctions for the
same offense, it does not prohibit one criminal sanction and one civil
penalty."' Moreover, proof of a criminal offense is unnecessary to
sustain a forfeiture. The defense of collateral estoppel, however,
still should be considered viable.2 12 The test for the application of
collateral estoppel is not whether the two proceedings are both crim-
inal or civil in nature, but whether substantially the same proof is
necessary to substantiate each action. 2 3 The claimant affirmatively
alleging the defense of collateral estoppel must show that the issue
has been decided by a court of competent jurisdiction in a previous
action.264 If in fact there has been no adjudication of the issue, as
when the charges have been dismissed or a nolle prosequi has been
entered in the criminal action, the general rule is that collateral
estoppel will not bar the forfeiture action.2 15 If the convicted party
has been pardoned, however, at least one court has reasoned that
258. 328 F. Supp. 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
259. 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
260. See, e.g., United States v. Kismetoglu, 476 F.2d 269 (9th Cir. 1973) (per curiam)
(acquittal in criminal proceeding no bar to forfeiture action).
261. United States v. One 1969 Buick Riviera, 493 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1974).
262. Contra, 7 CREIGHTON L. Rav. 471 (1974).
263. Stanley v. United States, 111 F.2d 898 (6th Cir. 1940); United States v. Rosenthal,
174 F. 652 (5th Cir. 1909). See also United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339
U.S. 485 (1950).
264. United States v. Burch, 294 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1961).
265. United States v. One 1969 Buick Riviera, 493 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1974); United States
v. A Lot of Precious Stones and Jewelry, 134 F. 61 (6th Cir. 1905).
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the forfeiture of property belonging to one pardoned for the criminal
offense would raise serious questions of constitutional due processY.2 1
Self-Incrimination 27
Confessions or admissions involuntarily made by a person upon
whom a police investigation has focused must be excluded from
evidence because they violate the self-incrimination clause of the
fifth amendment.2 18 The due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment makes the privilege against self-incrimination binding
on the states.2 9
One approach to the application of this right in forfeiture proceed-
ings is illustrated by Ted's Motors, Inc. v. United States,270 in which
the court held that the privilege against self-incrimination does not
apply to forfeitures. Basing its decision on the burden of proof issue
and the rules of evidence, the court concluded that the owner's
statements were admissible, even as hearsay, to show the requisite
probable cause. Because the action was in rem, no personal right
against self-incrimination could be claimed. Once probable cause
was demonstrated from the owner's statements, the burden shifted
to the claimant-lienholder to prove that the vehicle was not used in
violation of the statute. As no such proof was offered, the forfeiture
was granted. Other courts have used identical reasoning to uphold
forfeitures.27y
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of self-incrimination in
forfeiture proceedings in United States v. United States Coin and
Currency.27 2 Angelini had been convicted for violating federal gam-
bling registration and tax statutes. The United States then pro-
ceeded with a forfeiture action against money seized at the time of
266. United States v. One Lot of Eighteen Firearms, 325 F. Supp. 1326 (D.N.H. 1971).
267. For a general discussion of the privilege and its development in criminal proceedings,
see J. GEORGE, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMrTATIONS ON EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 87 (1973).
268. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964);
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957);
Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
269. Mallory v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52
(1964).
270. 217 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1954).
271. E.g., United States v. One 1955 Ford Sedan, 164 F. Supp. 729 (D. Md. 1958). See also
United States v. Bride, 308 F.2d 470 (9th Cir. 1962); United States v. One 1958 Pontiac
Coupe, 298 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1962).
272. 401 U.S. 715 (1971).
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his arrest. Angelini claimed that the registratiQn acts, which re-
quired the filing of gambling registration forms with the govern-
ment, violated his privilege against self-incrimination. Angelini re-
lied on Marchetti v. United States27 3 and Grosso v. United States, 27 4
Supreme Court decisions which had held the privilege applicable in
related criminal proceedings. As in the past, the government argued
that the proceeding was civil and in rem against the money allegedly
used in illegal gambling activities. The Court, rejecting the in rem
argument, determined that "[w]hen the forfeiture statutes are
viewed in their entirety, it is manifest that they are intended to
impose a penalty only upon those who are significantly involved in
a criminal enterprise. It follows from Boyd, Marchetti and Grosso
that the Fifth Amendment's privileges may properly be invoked in
these proceedings.2 5 Many lower courts have followed Coin and
Currency in cases based upon substantially the same facts.76
Coin and Currency thus stands for the proposition that the per-
sonal privilege against self-incrimination applies to parties whose
property is seized and proceeded against in an in rem action, even
though technically the individual is not the named defendant.277
One court has gone even further, interpreting Coin and Currency to
hold that a person may refuse to answer questions at a forfeiture
hearing.28 Thus, at least to some extent, the Supreme Court has
273. 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
274. 390 U.S. 62 (1968).
275. 401 U.S. at 721-22 (footnotes omitted).
276. See, e.g., Pasha v. United States, 484 F.2d 630 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. One
1961 Red Chevrolet Impala Sedan, 457 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. One 1967
Ford Thunderbird, 441 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1971); United States v. One Olivetti-Underwood
Elec. Adding Machine, 443 F.2d 373 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. One Philco Television,
443 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1971). But see United States v. 20 "Dealer's Choice" Machines, 483
F.2d 474 (4th Cir. 1973), rev'g 341 F. Supp. 1147 (D.S.C. 1972); United States v. One 1964
Ford Thunderbird, 445 F.2d 1064 (3d Cir. 1971).
277. In Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968), decided in the same year as Marchetti
and Grosso, the Court applied the self-incrimination privilege to the reporting requirements
under the National Firearms Act. Thus, it would appear that any consequent forfeiture action
based on that Act in which the claimant lost property due to the filing of then-required reports
would come within the Coin and Currency rationale. The Act has been amended to prohibit
lawful dealers from selling firearms to anyone who does not complete the required governmen-
tal forms. 26 U.S.C. § 5812(a) (1970). Thus, the statute no longer requires those directly
affected to incriminate themselves; instead, it is the transferor who makes the incriminating
statements. The amendment was constitutionally upheld in United States v. Freed, 401 U.S.
601 (1971). The Court relied heavily on the I.R.S. practice of not making the registration cards
available to other agencies.
278. United States v. One 1973 Volvo, 377 F. Supp. 810 (W.D. Tex. 1974). In Volvo the
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eliminated the in rem fiction used extensively in prior decisions. It
has not resolved, however, all of the important issues affecting the
protection against self-incrimination in forfeiture proceedings.
Other Constitutional Matters
"[C]offey, Boyd, One Plymouth Sedan and United States Coin
and Currency say that the forfeiture proceeding will not provide an
avenue through which the fundamental rights of protection against
illegal search and seizure can be frustrated.""' 9 Unfortunately, there
is a paucity of case law to assist in determining whether there are
other rights so entrenched in the Constitution that they may not be
subverted by a forfeiture action. In United States v. Zucker, 2 1 the
Supreme Court rejected the defendant's contention that he was
denied his sixth amendment right to be confronted with the wit-
nesses appearing against him when a deposition, taken in the defen-
dents' absence, was to be admitted into evidence. The Court relied,
however, on the judicially created fiction that personal rights do not
attach in an in rem action, which may no longer be tenable after
Coin and Currency.28'
The seventh amendment right to trial by jury applies to forfei-
tures, so long as the seizure did not occur on navigable waters and
thereby become subject to admiralty jurisdiction.2 82 The civil nature
of forfeiture proceedings, however, probably requires less than a
unanimous verdict.28 3
The eighth amendment proscribes the use of "cruel and unusual
punishment."' 4 This prohibition, though rarely asserted, may be an
effective means of challenging the application of forfeiture in cases
in which the involvement in criminal activity is less than
claimant argued that the provisions of the statute relating to remission and mitigation re-
quired a person to establish that he had no knowledge or reason to believe that the vehicle
was used in connection with the statutory violation, and therefore were unconstitutional
under the fifth amendment's self-incrimination protection. The court disagreed, pointing out
that such petitions are for the benefit of innocent third parties, such as mortgagees and
lessors.
279. Bramble v. Richardson, 498 F.2d 968 (10th Cir. 1974).
280. 161 U.S. 475 (1896).
281. The sixth amendment also provides the right to assistance of counsel. The issue was
raised unsuccessfully in Lee v. Thornton, 398 F. Supp. 970 (D. Vt. 1975).
282. Garnhart v. United States, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 162 (1872); Henderson's Distilled Spir-
its, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 44 (1871).
283. Cf. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972), noted in 1973 Wis. L. REv. 926.
284. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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"significant." For example, if the amount of contraband possessed
by the owner is small, punishment in many of the states is compara-
tively light.25 Arguably, forfeiture under these circumstances is
cruel and unusual punishment, especially if the adverse effect on
innocent parties is considered. Certainly, the forfeiture of a $20,000
yacht belonging to a leasing company because one marijuana ciga-
rette was found aboard approaches cruel and unusual punish-
ment.286 Whether the protection of the eighth amendment will be
extended to cover such a situation is a matter for speculation.2s? One
court has admitted that the eighth amendment may apply even
though the forfeiture action is in rem and civil in form.28 Clearly,
Coin and Currency supports this argument by partially removing
the in rem fiction.
A PROPOSED MODEL FORFEITURE AcT
The increasing number of constitutional challenges to modem
forfeiture laws and procedure, especially by innocent parties, com-
bined with the extension of personal constitutional rights to these
proceedings, indicate that the in rem fiction is no longer tenable,
representing only a persistent judicial adherence to the ancient,
anthropomorphic deodand. Equally important as the protections
offered to the claimant, however, is the effectiveness of forfeiture
laws in fulfilling their underlying purposes. The forfeiture of contra-
band secures public welfare by removing undesirable property from
the community. The object of the substantive law, then, is prophy-
lactic, to insulate society from contact with the property itself. The
same policy, however, does not underlie the forfeiture of
"beneficial" property, property "tainted" only by its use and not
because of its essential nature. Then the purpose of forfeiture is
threefold: to prevent further criminal use of the property; to deter,
285. For example, in New Mexico, possession of less than one ounce of marijuana is punish-
able upon the first offense by a maximum fine of $100. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 54-11-23(B)(1)
(Supp. 1975).
286. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
287. See 51 TEx. L. REV. 1411, 1417 (1973), wherein it was stated:
If the courts strike down even one forfeiture as excessive in relation to the offense
committed, they will have difficulty in refusing to entertain any future request
to measure the fitness of a sentence to the fact of the crime. Worse still, implicit
in judicial reversal of a sentence is a judgment on the validity of the legislative
purpose and the efficacy of the sanctioning statute promoting it.
288. Toepleman v. United States, 263 F.2d 697 (4th Cir. 1959).
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through threatened loss of property, the perpetration of crimes; and
to reimburse the government for its expenses in the apprehension
and prosecution of criminals.
Clearly, by removing the property from private possession, the
forfeiture laws do prevent further illegal use of the property. But so
long as property, such as vehicles, may be acquired with only a
small financial investment, through lease or daily rental, the loss to
the wrongdoer is only temporary.
Similarly, the deterrent effect of the financial sacrifice is minimal
and may even be considered a cost of doing business. Besides, eco-
nomic penalties, such as fines, are already available. Against this
realization must be weighed the substantial impact forfeiture has
upon innocent parties, such as lessors or lienholders, who often suf-
fer the real loss from forfeiture and who are less able to insure
themselves against such losses. Viewing forfeiture actions as in rem
and civil in nature ignores this disproportionate impact in deference
to procedural rubrics.
Secondly, forfeiture laws cannot achieve their intended deterrent
effect unless the wrongdoer is aware of their existence and appre-
ciates the risk he takes. The results of a survey conducted by the
author indicates that seventy-five percent of those arrested for
smuggling narcotics are unaware of the forfeiture laws affecting
their vehicles. Clearly, whatever deterrent effect forfeiture laws may
exert cannot outweigh their deleterious impact on innocent parties
if the laws are not given adequate publicity.
Although the revenues derived from the sale of forfeited property
may be used to offset the cost of investigating offenses and prosecut-
ing offenders, it is not clear whether the cost of prosecuting forfei-
ture actions overshadows the revenues gained. A report prepared by
the state of California emphasized that, through the repeal of that
state's forfeiture laws, the state would save approximately $600,000
annually.39 This net figure included the additional revenues ema-
nating from prosecution of the forfeiture laws. Shortly thereafter
California repealed its forfeiture laws. A similar study should be
made of the net financial effect of the active enforcement of federal
forfeiture statutes on federal costs. Only then can it be determined
whether the "benefits" of the reimbursement policy are real or illu-
sory.
289. CALIFORNIA STATE Gov'T REPORT ON ORGANIZATIONS AND ECONOMY (DEC. 12, 1966).
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The solution to these objections, however, is not to repeal forfei-
ture statutes but to reform them. As an additional or alternative
punitive device, forfeiture is a viable deterrent to crime, especially
narcotic offenses. One commentator has suggested that forfeiture
provisions be made a part of criminal law and be used, in the court's
discretion, as an additional penalty much the way criminal fines
currently are imposed.29 At least one such provision already exists
among the criminal penalties for poaching game on United states
reservations. 29 '
A similar suggestion was made by the court in United States v.
Cato Bros., Inc.,212 applying a provision of the Customs laws that
commends the seizure of vessels and other conveyances as security
for the payment of fines:293
There is a striking similarity to the function of the Court in deter-
mining the appropriate fine or penalty to be imposed upon one
found guilty of violating a penal statute. In both situations the
object to be attained is the fixing of a penalty commensurate with
the ends of justice . . . . If a proper way is open to save the
delinquent his pound of flesh that way should be followed unless
the interests of the public demand the application of a harsher
rule.2 94
A forfeiture law which requires a finding of guilty in the related
criminal proceedings, which places the penalty within the discretion
of the court as fines now are, and which allows seizure and forfeiture
as security for a monetary fine appears desirable. The primary con-
stitutional objection, the forfeiture of property without due process
when innocent persons are involved, would thereby be removed, and
only the offender's interest in the property would be subject to for-
feiture. No problems would arise in choosing the appropriate burden
of proof because a criminal conviction would be required before the
forfeiture proceedings could commence. The forfeiture proceeding
itself, however, would be conducted separately, after conviction and
before sentencing. Such a proceeding would include adequate notice
to all interested parties and a hearing in which the facts of owner-
290. NOTE, Forfeiture of Property Used in Illegal Acts, 38 Norm DAME LAw. 727 (1963).
See also Commercial Credit Corp. v. Congleton, 21 N.J. Super. 88, 90 A.2d 550 (1952).
291. 16 U.S.C. § 171 (1970).
292. 175 F. Supp. 11 (E.D. Va.), rev'd, 273 F.2d 153 (4th Cir. 1959).
293. 19 U.S.C. § 1594 (1970).
294. 175 F. Supp. at 816.
1978]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
ship could be made known to the court. In addition, the use of the
vehicle in the offense will have been determined conclusively in the
criminal proceedings. Nor will delays in the proceedings be proble-
matic because the accused's constitutional right to a speedy trial
would control. Of course, after the entry of judgment any hearing
on the forfeiture issue would necessarily have to be conducted with-
out delay.
The proposed Model Act set out below draws heavily on the Uni-
form Controlled Substances Act now in effect in many states. Be-
cause the Model Act is concerned primarily with conviction, how-
ever, some of the provisions in the Uniform Act are superfluous. The
Model Act is drafted around the narcotics laws but could easily be
adapted to liquor, customs, gambling, and other areas where prop-
erty is "involved" in criminal acts.
PROPOSED MODEL FORFEITURE ACT: CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
§ 1. TITLE AND EFFECTIVE DATE
This Act shall be known as the Model Forfeiture Act: Controlled
Substances and shall be effective immediately.
§ 2. REPEAL OF PRIOR LAW
Section - through and including Section - shall be and
hereby stand repealed.
§ 3. DEFINITIONS
The definitions provided in this Section shall apply only to the
Model Forfeiture Act. Any term in the Act not defined herein shall
be defined as provided in the Controlled Substance Act.
(a) "Facilitate" means to make the accomplishment thereof eas-
ier, less difficult, or to free from obstructions or hindrance.
(b) "Container" means any box, carton, crate, drum, barrel, bag,
suitcase, trunk, or any other container but shall not include any
vehicle, vessel, airplane, or any other means of conveyance.
§ 4. FORFEITURE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES AND RELATED PROPERTY
Upon conviction for any offense against the Controlled Substances
Act the Court may order any of the property described in subsec-
tions (a) through and including (d) below, shown to the satisfaction
of the Court at trial on the offense to relate to said offense, to be
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forfeited to the United States; or, in the alternative, the Court may
order such property to be held as security for the payment of any
fine and/or costs imposed by the Court and, if so ordered, said
property may be proceeded against in the same manner as foreclo-
sure on judgment to recover the same.
The following are subject to forfeiture:
(a) All controlled substances which have been manufactured,
distributed, dispensed or acquired in violation of the Con-
trolled Substance Act;
(b) All raw materials, products and equipment of any kind
which are used or intended for use in manufacturing, com-
pounding, processing, delivering, importing or exporting any
controlled substance in violation of the Controlled Substances
Act;
(c) All property which is used, or intended for use, as a con-
tainer for property described in subsection (a) or (b);
(d) All books, records and research products and materials,
including formulas, microfilm, tapes and data which are used,
or intended for use, in violation of the Controlled Substances
Act.
The forfeiture of any of the above property may be in addition to
or in lieu of any other penalty and/or fine provided for in this Act.
OFFICIAL COMMENT
Section 3 provides for the forfeiture of any controlled substances
and property used in connection with controlled substances. It
should be noted that a criminal conviction, whether for a felony or
a misdemeanor, is required. By requiring a conviction beforehand,
the necessity for a second hearing to determine facts other than
those concerning ownership is obviated. The phrase, "shown to the
satisfaction of the Court," places the burden upon the government
to show that the item was related to the offense. Thus, in order to
enter an order of forfeiture, the court, as part of the sentencing
process, must be satisfied that the item sought to be forfeited is the
same item that was involved in the offense. Because forfeiture is
part of the sentencing process, no issue concerning the appropriate
standard of proof should arise.
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The use of the word "other" in the last sentence of this section is
intended to show that the forfeiture is a fine or penalty and thus is
governed by the same policy considerations controlling fines.
§ 5. FORFEITURES OF CONVEYANCES
Upon conviction for any offense against the Controlled Substances
Act involving trafficking or possession with intent to distribute con-
trolled substances (§§ - and - of the Controlled Substances
Act), the Court may order the forfeiture to the United States of the
property described below provided that it is shown to the satisfac-
tion of the Court at the trial of the offense that the subject property
is related to the offense; or, in the alternative, the Court may order
that such property be held as security for the payment of any fine
and/or costs imposed by the Court and, if so ordered, the property
may be proceeded against in the same manner as foreclosure on
judgment to recover the same.
The following property is subject to forfeiture.
(a) All property described in § 3, subsections (a), (b), (c) and
(d) above;
(b) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles or vessels,
which are used, or intended for use, to transport or to facilitate
the transportation of any property described in § 3, subsection
(a).
The forfeiture of any of the above property may be in addition to
or in lieu of any .other penalty and/or fine provided for in this Act.
OFFICIAL COMMENT
(See Comment to § 3 above). This section provides for the forfei-
ture of conveyances involved in trafficking crimes related to con-
trolled substances. All crimes in this category are felonies. Here the
objective is not only one of punishment but also to impose the
economic loss upon the offender and to remove the conveyance from
the drug traffic. The Controlled Substances Act defines "Traf-
ficking" as follows:
(1) [The] manufacture of any controlled substance;
(2) [The] distribution, sale, barter or giving away of any con-
trolled substance which is a narcotic drug; or
(3) [The] possession with intent to distribute any controlled
substance which is a narcotic drug.
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Note, too, that the court must be satisfied that the conveyance was
used or was intended for use in the transportation of or to facilitate
the transportation of contraband.
§ 6. COMMON CARRIERS
Notwithstanding the provisions of § 5:
(a) No conveyance used by any common carrier in the transaction
of business as a common carrier is subject to forfeiture under this
Act unless it appears that the owner or other person in charge of the
conveyance is a consenting party or privy to a violation of the Con-
trolled Substances Act.
(b) No conveyance is subject to forfeiture under this Section by
reason of any act or omission established by the owner to have been
committed or omitted without his knowledge or consent.
(c) A forfeiture of a conveyance encumbered by a bona fide secu-
rity interest shall be subject to the interest of the secured party if
the secured party neither had knowledge of nor consented to the act
or omission, and the security interest was created prior to the com-
mission of the offense for which the accused party has been con-
victed. The burden of proof shall be on the party claiming the excep-
tion or exemption set out above.
OFFIIAL COMMENT
This provision of the Act ensures that the interest of "innocent"
parties in the conveyance will be protected to the greatest extent
possible. The prior requirement that the claimant show that the
vehicle was stolen is no longer necessary. The burden, however, as
with all exceptions, lies with the party claiming the exemption.
§ 7. PROCEDURE
(a) Property subject to forfeiture under the Controlled Substances
Act may be seized by any enforcement officer upon an order issued
by any Court having jurisdiction.
(b) Seizure may be made without such an order if:
(1) the seizure is incident to an arrest or search under a search
warrant or an inspection under an administrative inspection
warrant;
(2) the property subject to seizure has been the subject of a
prior order of forfeiture in a forfeiture proceeding based upon
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the Controlled Substances Act;
(3) the enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that
the property, which is a controlled substance, is directly or
indirectly dangerous to health or safety; or
(4) the enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that
the property was used or is intended to be used in violation of
or to facilitate the violation of the Controlled Substances Act.
(c) In the event of a seizure pursuant to subsection (a), a proceed-
ing under subsection (f) shall be instituted promptly, but in no case
later than fifteen (15) days following the seizure. If forfeiture is
ordered by a Court, it shall be ordered at the time of sentencing, but
in no case later than thirty (30) days after the entry of judgment
against the accused.
(d) Property taken or detained under this Section shall not be
subject to replevin, but is deemed to be in the custody of the United
States subject only to the orders and decrees of the Court. When
property is seized under the Controlled Substances Act, the enforce-
ment officer may:
(1) place the property under seal;
(2) remove the property to a place designated by the enforce-
ment officer; or
(3) require the appropriate agency to take custody of the prop-
erty and remove it to an appropriate location for disposition in
accordance with law.
(e) When property is forfeited under the Controlled Substances
Act, the agency responsible shall:
(1) sell that which is not required to be destroyed by law, and
the proceeds thereof shall revert to the general fund;
(2) take custody of the property for use by law enforcement
agencies in the enforcement of the Controlled Substances Act
or remove it for disposition in accordance with the law;
(f) When property is seized under the Controlled Substances Act
and is not subject to Summary Forfeiture as provided in § 8, the
seizing agency shall:
(1) make all reasonable efforts to determine the name(s) and
address(es) of the owner(s) of the property;
(2) make all reasonable efforts to determine whether the prop-
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erty is subject to a security lien for the payment of any indebt-
edness;
(3) notify the above parties that the property has been seized
subject to the provisions of this Act and give them reasonable
notice of all hearings and other judicial proceedings which may
affect their interests in the property.
(i) Notice shall be mailed by prepaid certified or registered mail
to the owner or other interested party, if his address be known, and
if not known, by publishing such notice once per week for three
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation within the
county in which the property was seized.
(ii) The failure of an owner or secured party to appear shall not
affect his property rights if proof of ownership or proof of a perfected
security interest shown to be prior to the date of the commission of
the offense is made to the Court within sixty (60) days from the date
of the forfeiture order. Thereafter, the property may be disposed of
as set forth herein.
(iii) No forfeiture of any property described in §§ 4 and 5 shall
be ordered if the enforcement agency knows or has reason to believe
that the owner of such property is a person, persons, corporation,
or partnership other than the convicted party.
(iv) No forfeiture of any property descibed in § § 4 and 5 shall
be ordered if the enforcement agency knows or has reason to believe
that the property is security for indebtedness owed to any person or
persons, corporation or partnership, except that an order may be
entered forfeiting the interest in the property belonging to the con-
victed party.
§ 8. SUMMARY FORFEITURE
(a) Controlled substances that are possessed, transferred, sold or
offered for sale in violation of the Controlled Substances Act are
contraband and shall be seized and summarily forfeited to the
United States, regardless of whether the owner thereof is unknown.
(b) Species of plants from which controlled substances, possession
of which is prohibited under any circumstances, may be derived,
which have been planted or cultivated in violation of the Controlled
Substance Act, or of which the owners or cultivators are unknown,
or which are wild growths, may be seized and summarily forfeited
to the United States.
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OMCIAL COMMENT
This section provides for the summary forfeiture of property which
under no circumstances has beneficial use. Although subsection (c)
may seem harsh to those who grow Indian hemp (marijuana) for use
in ropes, twines, etc., the cultivation of these substances is already
restricted and regulated. Since the market for these products is now
quite small because of available synthetic substitutes, no real prob-
lem should exist.
